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ARTICLE 
THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENCY:  
CASH TO CRYPTOS TO SOVEREIGN DIGITAL 
CURRENCIES 
Anton N. Didenko* & Ross P. Buckley** 
ABSTRACT 
In 2009, Bitcoin created a world-first decentralized alternative 
currency that has spawned over 1,700 imitations by private parties. In 
2018, governments finally joined the race, as Venezuela issued a 
world-first sovereign digital currency. Major economies like Canada, 
China, Singapore and the United Kingdom are all developing their own 
versions. These new versions differ significantly from Bitcoin and 
among themselves, creating the potential to flood the global financial 
system with a myriad of new digital currencies. Existing taxonomies of 
currency struggle with the speed of change (frequently due to 
inadequate understanding of the underlying technology) and, as a 
result, remain incomplete and filled with confusing and conflicting 
vocabulary (with terms like “virtual currencies,” “digital currencies,” 
“cryptocurrencies” frequently being used to refer to the same thing). 
This Article resolves this problem. First, it analyzes existing forms of 
currency based on their functional characteristics and provides a 
comprehensive taxonomy. Second, it integrates the likely forms of 
upcoming sovereign digital currencies into this taxonomy and outlines 
the corresponding challenges. At the moment, no major economy seems 
keen to issue a sovereign digital currency, but if one does, others will, 
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for good reasons, respond in kind and the ground will be laid for a 
sovereign digital currency battle royale. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are today over 2,000 new, privately held and controlled 
digital currencies across the globe and the rush to create them shows 
no sign of abating.1 The first of its kind was Bitcoin, established in 
2009.2 This digital decentralized alternative to state-controlled 
currency offered new opportunities for end-users, by providing 
additional methods for transferring or storing value. In developing 
countries, mobile money, issued and used on mobile phones, provided 
another digital alternative, with the best known example being M-Pesa, 
launched by Safaricom in Kenya in 2007.3 
These new products have created additional risks for national and 
international payment systems and triggered a regulatory response. 
Mobile money (also known as “electronic money” or “e-money”) 
products have largely become regulated activities, although many 
issues remain unresolved.4 In the case of Bitcoin and its spin-offs, 
regulation has proven distinctly problematic for technical reasons: 
 
1. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ 
[https://perma.cc/WA4W-BJJT]. 
2. Bitcoin is the first digital currency issued without a single administrator or repository. 
Its operation was described in SEC v. Shavers as follows: “Bitcoins are held at, and sent to and 
from, bitcoin ‘addresses.’ A bitcoin ‘wallet’ is a software file that holds bitcoin addresses. Along 
with each bitcoin address, a bitcoin wallet stores the ‘private key’ for the address, essentially a 
password used by the holder to access the bitcoins held at the address, as well as the transaction 
history associated with the address. Whoever has the private key for a bitcoin address controls 
the bitcoins held at that address.” SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
130781, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014). 
3. See ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, ENABLING MOBILE MONEY TRANSFER: 
THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA’S TREATMENT OF M-PESA 12 (2010). For additional detail 
concerning M-Pesa, see Nick Hughes & Susie Lonie, M-Pesa: Mobile Money for the 
“Unbanked” Turning Cellphones into 24-Hour Tellers in Kenya, 2(1-2) INNOVATIONS: TECH., 
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 63 (2007); Benjamin Ngugi, Matthew Pelowski, & Javier G. 
Ogembo, M-pesa: A Case Study of the Critical Early Adopters’ Role in the Rapid Adoption of 
Mobile Money Banking in Kenya, 43 ELECTRONIC J. INFO. SYS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 
(2010); Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-Pesa in Kenya: Financial 
Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J. L., TECH. & ARTS 375, 399 (2013); Isaac Mbiti & 
David N. Weil, Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper No. 17129, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17129.pdf. 
4. See, e.g., Louise Malady, Cheng-Yun Tsang & Ross P. Buckley, Promoting Financial 
Inclusion by Encouraging the Payment of Interest on E-Money, 40 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 
1558 (2017); Katharine Kemp & Ross P. Buckley, Resolution Powers Over E-Money Providers, 
40 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 1539, 1539-57 (2017); David Ramos, Javier Solana, Ross P. 
Buckley & Jonathan Greenacre, Protecting Mobile Money Customer Funds in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 705 (2016). 
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without a central server or a single operator, it has been rather difficult 
to identify those to whom regulation should apply (after all, rules apply 
to people and businesses they create—not to technology, which lacks 
self-awareness, at least this day and age). Instead, the most popular 
regulatory measure has taken the form of warnings concerning 
potential risks and—ironically—lack of proper regulation.5 
As the new privately issued digital currencies have kept 
multiplying, it was perhaps only a matter of time before regulators 
would devise new strategies where regulation had thus far proven 
ineffective. Governments and central banks around the globe have 
already started developing new sovereign digital currency models, 
inspired by the Bitcoin example.6 These projects are all in different 
stages of development, and regulators are prone to hastening slowly 
and testing the technology before applying it in practice. However, the 
interest in creating an “official” alternative to Bitcoin and its numerous 
copycats is clear and cannot be ignored. 
The many national initiatives to develop new sovereign digital 
currencies raise a whole range of issues. How will these new projects 
impact the financial system, both domestically and internationally? 
What are the opportunities and challenges faced by central banks and 
governments in developing the new currency types? But perhaps the 
first question should be different: how do these new currencies 
 
5. See, e.g., Perkins Coie, Digital Currencies: International Actions and Regulations, 
PERKINS COIE (June 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/digital-currencies-
international-actions-and-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/C677-GRR7]. 
6. See Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, BANK INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 55, 57 (2017); John Barrdear & Michael Kumhof, The Macroeconomics 
of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies, 3, 17 (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 605, 
2016), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2016/the-
macroeconomics-of-central-bank-issued-digital-currencies.pdf?la=en&hash=
341B602838707E5D6FC26884588C912A721B1DC1 [https://perma.cc/4LFB-8HLX];; Walter 
Engert & Ben Fung, Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and Implications, 2, 26 (Bank 
of Canada, Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16, 2017), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/sdp2017-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VC9-BJU6]; see also Ruth 
Wandhöfer, The Future of Digital Retail Payments in Europe: A Role for Central Bank Issued 
Crypto Cash?, EUR. CENT. BANK (Oct. 2017), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/shared/pdf/20171130_ECB_BdI_conference/paym
ents_conference_2017_academic_paper_wandhoefer.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPA6-YMJ5]; JP 
Koning, Fedcoin: A Central Bank-issued Cryptocurrency, R3 REPORTS (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.r3.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/fedcoin_central-bank_R3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VJ4W-FQ4L]; see generally GEORGE DANEZIS & SARAH MEIKLEJOHN, 
CENTRALLY BANKED CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2016), https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/502.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E2YT-Z48X]. 
. 
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compare to their existing counterparts, most of which are already 
digital?7 
This Article sets the foundation for a comprehensive analysis of 
existing initiatives to establish a new form of sovereign digital 
currency. Its objective is to put these new projects into perspective, 
taking a broader look at the existing payment systems and known 
currency types. One difficulty with achieving the above goal is the lack 
of a common taxonomy encompassing all existing forms of currencies. 
Absence of agreed terminology (discussed in greater detail in the next 
section) inhibits in-depth dialogue and analysis, leading some 
regulators to acknowledge that “[w]ith the exception of a few articles 
from respectable media sources or economics journals, it is almost 
impossible to find any comprehensive papers on this issue.”8 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II 
outlines the key challenges resulting from the absence of a common 
taxonomy of various currencies and explains the rationale behind the 
proposed approach. Part III provides a brief historic outlook on the 
concept of currency. Parts IV and V analyze the concept of currency in 
the context of formal and alternative payment systems, respectively. 
Part VI examines the emerging new approaches to sovereign digital 
currency. Part VII summarizes the conclusions. 
II. A QUAGMIRE OF CONFUSING VOCABULARY 
There is no accepted vocabulary covering the entire array of 
different media of exchange, no agreed taxonomy. At first glance, this 
does not appear to raise major issues—after all, it is perfectly 
acceptable to disagree on terminology.9 However, problems arise when 
 
7. See Jeff Desjardins, All of the World’s Money and Markets in One Visualization, 
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-money-markets-
one-visualization-2017/ [https://perma.cc/KRK7-CHCV]. 
8. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 33 (2012), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VW8Z-57ZN] [hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012] (providing a basis for 
discussion of various forms of virtual currencies). 
9. Bitcoin is known as many things. It has been characterized as “cryptocurrency.” See 
ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW MILLER & STEVEN 
GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES 20 (Princeton Univ. Press, eds., 
1st ed. 2016). It has been characterized as “virtual currency.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
2012, supra note 8, at 6. It has also been characterized as “digital currency.” See Financial 
Systems Inquiry, Clearer graduated payments regulation, FSI (Oct. 2015), 
http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/chapter-3/graduated-payments/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZN85-YBEW]. 
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functionally similar concepts need to be joined together to create a 
common classification or when a new technology or its application that 
disrupts the existing payment system needs to be integrated into it. The 
lack of a common approach creates complications not only for 
academics, but also for regulators.10 Even experts in the field are 
presently confused—and scholarship and regulation exist to serve the 
interests of far more than the select few: 
So, the unsettled vocabulary is relevant to how financial regulators 
understand, discuss, and ultimately regulate (or not) the 
technology or its uses, as well as how courts will interpret any 
regulation or regulatory guidance in the future. However, the 
vocabulary problems are also more broadly applicable to any 
regulators evaluating the technology, including those outside the 
financial sector, as well as to groups considering implementing the 
technology in whatever domain.11 
The existing issues with terminology can be summarized as 
follows. 
First, the concepts of “money” and “currency” are frequently used 
interchangeably or inconsistently.12 From an economic perspective, 
this may reflect a failure to appreciate the three separate functions of 
the former (unit of account, medium of exchange, store of value) and 
the singular defining function of the latter (medium of exchange). In a 
legal sense, the problem is even more complex, since the word 
“money” is frequently used “as a generic term” without a 
corresponding definition and clear meaning.13 
 
10. See Ross P. Buckley, Jonathan Greenacre & Louise Malady, The Regulation of Mobile 
Money in Malawi, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 435, 467-68, 493-94 (2015). 
11. Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 718 (2017). 
12. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 13 (defining “virtual 
currency” as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its 
developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community’” 
(emphasis added)). Three years later, the ECB published a new report that adopted a different 
view and defined “virtual currency” as “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central 
bank, credit institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an 
alternative to money.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES – A 
FURTHER ANALYSIS 25 (2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrency
schemesen.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX8K-QMU5] [hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
2015]. 
13. See Benjamin Geva, Is Cryptocurrency Money and Why Does It Matter?, TORYS (June 
6, 2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/06/is-cryptocurrency-money-and-
why-does-it-matter (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
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Second, different terms are used as synonyms. Frequently, it is 
practically impossible to distinguish one term from another without a 
corresponding explanation, and, against this background, the 
emergence of new types of sovereign digital currency complicate 
things even further. Differences between “electronic”, “digital” and 
“virtual” currencies are often contrived, and although the parties to the 
dialogue concerning current monetary issues seem to understand each 
other, it is frequently acknowledged that the existing taxonomy is 
confusing.14 
Third, difficulties arise when one term becomes part of another, 
without corresponding adjustment or when the same term is used to 
describe different issues.15 
Fourth, some of the more recent developments in technology have 
become very closely associated with colloquial terms that fail to 
convey their defining features or focus on aspects that are not material. 
As a result, the emergence of a different, but related technology or 
product may make such terms meaningless. Take, for instance, the 
word “cryptocurrency.” In existing literature, cryptocurrencies are 
classified as decentralized bi-directional (i.e., fully convertible) virtual 
currencies (i.e., alternative currencies).16 However, introduction of 
centrally issued digital currencies17 would render this classification 
redundant.18 Furthermore, some of the newer technologies, like 
 
14. In its research on “virtual currencies” the European Central Bank concludes that 
“virtual currencies should not be bundled into the generic words of money or currency, even 
though their technical appearance takes a form which has some similarities to scriptural money 
and/or electronic money” and eventually adopts a different definition that no longer refers to 
“money.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 25. The research of the Bank 
of England concludes that “the phrase ‘digital currency’ is, perhaps, a regrettable one, as it may 
invite a number of misunderstandings among casual readers” and “there is no innovation in the 
provision of an electronic form of money, as the vast majority of money in a modern economy 
is already electronic and has been for some time.” See Barrdear & Kumhof, supra note 6, at 4. 
15. In its Guidance on the Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, the US Department of Treasury defines “virtual 
currency” as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but 
does not have all the attributes of real currency.” See US Department of Treasury Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FINCEN (Mar. 2013) 1, 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JPH-
XQ2B]. 
16. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 6; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK 
FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 5 (2014). 
17.  For a discussion on centrally issued digital currencies, see infra Section IV.B.3. 
18. In its report on digital currencies, the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) 
stresses that these alternative currencies are “not a liability of any individual or institution.” See 
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Bitcoin, are often subject to regulatory scrutiny in the form of warnings, 
prohibitions, or express prescriptive rules. The effectiveness of these 
measures hinges on clear and unambiguous definitions of their subject 
matter—yet regulators frequently reuse the existing terminology and, 
by doing so, fail to achieve the clarity required. 
Fifth, occasionally new technologies end up being so deeply 
associated with their applications, that absurdity results. Blockchain19 
is one such example. On the one hand, blockchain and its first 
application—Bitcoin—are sometimes used interchangeably. A 
publication of the UK government, no less, states: 
However, when people talk about the block chain [sic], they tend 
to mean the collection of technologies and techniques that 
underpin the Bitcoin system, which other projects have used as 
inspiration because they solve unrelated problems in finance and 
elsewhere.20 
Yet, blockchain is but one of many technologies that, operating 
together, give Bitcoin its functionality. To equate blockchain with 
Bitcoin is plain silly. On the other hand, the perceived strength and 
resilience of Bitcoin has generated the popular, but ridiculous, view 
that all blockchains are inherently strong and resilient.21 This 
 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2015). The emergence of 
an “official” cryptocurrency would change this as well. 
19. Blockchain is a special database structure first utilized in Bitcoin to link together data 
arranged in individual blocks in append-only chronological order. Bitcoin’s blockchain uses 
cryptographic hashing to uniquely identify each block and uses this identification as a reference 
to connect different blocks into a single “chain.” Although the basic features of Bitcoin were 
explained in a whitepaper by an author named Satoshi Nakamoto, see Satoshi Nakamoto, 
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Oct. 2008) https://bitcoin.org/
bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W3N-NZMM], the term “blockchain” was not introduced in the 
whitepaper and became widespread only subsequently. For some of the earliest mentions of the 
term, see, e.g., richbodo, Usage of the Word “Blockchain,” MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@richbodo/common-use-of-the-word-blockchain-5b916cecef29 
[https://perma.cc/UA8H-FK4R]. 
20. UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond 
Block Chain, GOV’T OFF. SCI. (Jan. 2016) 34, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-
technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB4V-JE84] (emphasis added). 
21. See, e.g., MARC PILKINGTON, RES. HANDBOOK DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 15 (F. 
Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016); Chamber of Digital Commerce, Digital Currency 
Group & Center for Financial Markets and Policy at Georgetown University McDonough 
School of Business, Blockchain and Financial Inclusion (White Paper Mar. 2017) 8, 
http://finpolicy.georgetown.edu/sites/finpolicy.georgetown.edu/files/Blockchain%20and%20Fi
nancial%20Inclusion%20120417.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43B-NH7M]; Andrea Tinianow & 
Caitlin Long, Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARV. L. 
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association has proven so strong that lawmakers in Arizona included in 
recent legislation that data on a blockchain “is immutable and auditable 
and provides an uncensored truth.”22 This surprisingly maximalist 
approach has been subject to thorough critique in the academic 
literature but remains in the legislation.23 
In the light of the above issues, this Article proposes a new 
taxonomy that accommodates existing currencies and the new and 
upcoming variations. This taxonomy possesses five key features. 
First, it applies a functional—not a legal—test as the main 
criterion.24 This means that regulatory status does not affect 
classification, instead applying the logic “that what walks like a duck, 
quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, is a duck.” One of the benefits 
of the suggested classification is that it disregards the objectives for 
which currencies may be used, because these features determine their 
end-use, rather than functionality, and can lead to endless 
categorization into types and sub-types. For example, so-called 
community currencies are not classified separately: depending on their 
characteristics, they may fall into different categories. 
Second, it is regulation-neutral for several reasons. On the one 
hand, the law does not always provide a sufficient basis for 
classification, omitting some currencies altogether or using 
inconsistent terminology. Little would be gained by confirming that 
currencies not issued by the state are not considered a lawful currency 
and legal tender in that state.25 On the other hand, regulation frequently 
creates exceptions and exclusions from definitions based not on the 
underlying features of a certain currency, but instead on its potential to 
cause trouble when things go wrong. 
One such example abides in EU law, where an electronic store of 
value convertible by the issuer into official currency at the 1:1 ratio and 
otherwise compliant with the definition of “electronic money,” is not 
 
SCH. FORUM. CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-
corporate-finance/ [https://perma.cc/PYJ4-ZMTN]. 
22. See An Act Amending Section 44-7003, Arizona Revised Statutes; Amending Title 
44, Chapter 26, Arizona Revised Statutes, By Adding Article 5; Relating To Electronic 
Transactions § 2 AZ HB2417 (2017) (emphasis added). 
23. Walch, supra note 11, at 743-45. 
24. Although currencies are analyzed by reference to their functional characteristics, legal 
implications still need to be considered—particularly for separating formal and alternative 
payment systems, as discussed below. 
25. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 24. 
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treated as such. This follows from Article 1(4) of the E-Money 
Directive26 and Article 3(k) of the Payment Services Directive,27 which 
exclude from the scope of the E-Money Directive services “based on 
instruments that can be used to acquire goods or services only in the 
premises used by the issuer or under a commercial agreement with the 
issuer either within a limited network of service providers or for a 
limited range of goods or services.”28  
In a similar fashion, Section 9(3) of Australia’s Payment Systems 
(Regulation) Act 1998 (“the Act”) permits the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (“RBA”) to exempt from the Act certain facilities with 
limited impact, having regard to “any restrictions that limit the number 
or types of people who may purchase the facility” or “any restrictions 
that limit the number or types of people to whom payments may be 
made using the facility.”29 Facilities covered by such exception do not 
qualify as “purchased payment facilities” (“PPF”).30 The RBA has 
exercised this authority on a number of occasions, thus excluding, 
among other things, (i) gift card facilities,31 (ii) loyalty schemes,32 (iii) 
electronic road toll services,33 (iv) prepaid mobile phone accounts,34 
(v) facilities limited to AUD$10 million (in total)35 and (vi) facilities 
whereby payments can be made to no more than fifty persons.36 
The above exceptions from EU and Australian law are based on 
the assumption that the limited scope of certain facilities removes the 
 
26. Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267) (amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC). 
27. Directive 2007/64/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 319) (amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC), replaced by Directive 
2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) (amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC). 
28.  See Directive 2007/64/EC, art. 3(k), 2007 O.J. (L 319) (amending Directives 97/7/EC, 
2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC), replaced by 
Directive 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337) (amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC). 
29. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) § 9(3) (Austl.). 
30. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) § 9(1) (Austl.). 
31. Reserve Bank of Australia, Declaration No 1 of 2006, RBA, 
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2006/pdf/mr-06-02-purchased-payment-facilities-dec-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDG4-BZDQ]. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Reserve Bank of Australia, Declaration No 2 of 2006, RBA, 
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2006/pdf/mr-06-02-purchased-payment-facilities-dec-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLF6-2L2U]. 
36. Id. 
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need to regulate them. Also, these exceptions apply to the scope of the 
regulatory instruments, rather than the definitions themselves (which 
remain largely functional). Although the result is the same (excepted 
facilities are not regulated), functionally the exceptions fully satisfy the 
relevant definitions of electronic money and purchased payment 
facilities, respectively. 
Third, the proposed taxonomy is technology-neutral. The problem 
with taxonomy based on technology is that technology changes and – 
as is demonstrated by the blockchain example above37 – can be readily 
misunderstood. 
Fourth, it focuses on the concept of “currency,”38 rather than 
“money” (although certain references to basic theories and technical 
concepts are, of course, unavoidable). For the purposes of suggested 
functional analysis, the term “money” that is often used in literature is 
too abstract: with enough qualifications (such as the limited ability to 
perform one or more functions of money),39 almost anything of value 
can be classified as such;40 conversely, if interpreted more broadly, 
many national currencies will not qualify as money either.41 As a result, 
references to the term “money” are often used without further 
explanation as if its meaning is obvious, which creates taxonomy 
issues. For example, in its taxonomy of money and exchange 
mechanisms the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) refers to 
“money in traditional sense,” clarifying that this means money 
“denominated in a sovereign currency.”42 Overall, a discussion about 
the “moneyness” of various assets is outside the scope of this Article. 
 
37. See UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, supra note 20. 
38. Merriam Webster dictionary defines “currency” as “something . . . that is in circulation 
as a medium of exchange.” In this Article, currency is thus understood broadly, by reference 
only to the medium of exchange function, disregarding other functions of money (such as store 
of value and unit of account). Currency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/currency [https://perma.cc/RAF5-HMZE]. 
39. See LOCKE, infra note 66; LOCKE, infra note 67; TOBIN, infra note 68. 
40. See, e.g., Aleksander Berentsen & Fabian Schar, The Case for Central Bank Electronic 
Money and the Non-case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, 100 FED. RESERVE BANK ST. 
LOUIS 97, 97-98 (2018). (taking a broad view on the concept of money and classifying assets 
used as a store of value (e.g. gold) as “commodity money”). 
41. From the economics perspective, this would be true for highly volatile currencies that 
fail to fulfil the store of value function. For further detail, see Garrick Hileman, Alternative 
Currencies: A Historical Survey and Taxonomy 4-8 (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747975 (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
42. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 6. 
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Fifth, the different currencies are examined through the lens of 
two payment systems: (i) formal and (ii) alternative. The distinction is 
based on their regulatory status, the latter (alternative) being the 
residual category. Such breadth of scope is important for a number of 
reasons. Unlike regulation, where failure to meet any of the legal 
definitions can be an expected outcome (meaning that the facility is not 
regulated at all), a taxonomy should be complete. For example, in the 
European Union certain community currencies can be classified neither 
as “electronic money” (due to Article 1(4) of the E-Money Directive 
and Article 3(k) of the Payment Services Directive), nor as “virtual 
currencies” (pursuant to section 11 of the Preamble to the Fifth Anti-
Money Laundering Directive).43 Furthermore, the classification needs 
to be broad enough to encompass the most recent developments, such 
as the emergence of new digital currencies issued by sovereign states. 
Finally, a residual approach is already used in the regulation of certain 
currencies. As discussed in Section V.B.2,44 it is possible that the same 
facility could qualify as both “electronic money” under the E-Money 
Directive and as a “virtual currency” under the Fifth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive – if not for the condition that anything having a 
“legal” status of currency or money under the law is not a virtual 
currency. 
III. USEFUL BUT WORTHLESS: CURRENCY AS THE BACKBONE 
OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
Early historic forms of money, such as metallic coins that can be 
traced back to as early as 2200 BC,45 possessed inherent value based 
on the quality and quantity of materials from which they were made. 
This contrasts with modern payment systems that are largely based on 
electronic records and ever decreasing use of physical money. 
For lawyers, the legal characteristics of money historically 
remained secondary to the more pragmatic questions underpinning 
commercial turnover – their functionality. The Roman jurist Paul 
engaged in a discussion on the legal nature of money only insofar as 
 
43.  Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending Directives 2015/849, 2009/138/EC 
and 2013/36/EU). 
44. See infra Section V.B.2. 
45. For a more detailed discussion of the earlier primitive forms of money, see GLYN 
DAVIES, A HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 34-48 (3d ed. 
2002). 
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was necessary to differentiate between contracts of sale and barter.46 
Medieval lawyers explained the distinction between the actual value of 
coins and their declared value established by the state not to answer an 
abstract legal question about the nature of money, but to comply with 
the legal requirements of loan repayments.47 Even Charles Dumoulin’s 
claim that “the form and substance of money, as money, is not its matter 
of physical appearance” was simply an argument to support his views 
on proper contractual discharge.48 
As a result, the term “money” could have completely different 
legal meanings (depending on the circumstances) when interpreted by 
lawyers. In a testator’s will, its broad construction was justified, to 
encompass various assets in one’s estate. For the purposes of loan 
repayment, however, a narrower interpretation was utilized, permitting 
only certain coins to be used to discharge an obligation and thus 
recognizing that not all coined money was the same. For example, 
foreign coins were historically viewed as legally distinct from their 
domestic counterparts, as a matter of customary or positive law.49 In 
English law, the concept of “legal tender money” developed from the 
legal rules on the performance of debts, which only permitted good 
discharge by tendering coins issued or adopted by the Crown.50 In the 
famous 1899 judgment Moss v. Hancock, Justice Darling  cited Francis 
Walker in “Money, Trade, and Industry” as the author of the best 
(legal) definition of money “as currency, and not as medals”: 
[T]hat which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the 
community in final discharge of debts and full payment for 
commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the 
character or credit of the person who offers it and without the 
intention of the person who receives it to consume it or apply it to 
any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of debts 
or payment for commodities.51 
The evolution of money eventually proceeded towards monetary 
nominalism, by separating the legally recognized value of money from 
 
46. DAVID FOX & WOLFGANG ERNST, MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: 
MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 7 (1st ed. 2016). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 8. 
49. Id. at 9. 
50. Id. 
51. Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 Q.B. 116 (Eng.). 
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the substance of which it is made.52 Just like today, technological 
innovation was generally outpacing legal change: specialized financial 
institutions (i.e., banks) were established to pool money from their 
clients, but the law was struggling to adequately explain the nature of 
the bank-client relationship, including clients’ rights to balances in 
their accounts.53 At the same time, the sovereign prerogative over 
money initially only covered coinage, leaving coin substitutes, such as 
bankers’ notes and transferable ledger balances, in the hands of private 
parties and outside “formal” financial law.54 Acceptance of such 
substitutes, at least initially, depended on the degree of confidence and 
public trust existing among their users, and the substitutes themselves 
can be seen as “privately created currencies” operating outside the 
sovereign’s monopoly.55 
With time, the sovereign’s monopoly covered even coin 
substitutes that were assigned the status of official (i.e., national, 
regional or international) currency.56 In the words of Adam Smith, “[a] 
prince who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should be 
paid in a paper money of a certain kind might thereby give a certain 
value to this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge 
and redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince.”57 
This approach was later developed by Georg Knapp, who argued that 
the medium which carried the monetary units was not more than a 
token (“charta”) with no intrinsic value as a physical substance.58 
 
52. The 18th century saw the emergence of “commodity-backed” money in the form of 
certificates exchangeable for a fixed amount of certain commodity. Unlike the underlying 
commodity, this form of money had no intrinsic value: its demand resulted from (i) acceptance 
by state and (ii) redeemability into precious metals. This brought greater portability of money 
and made possible large-scale transactions. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, 
at 9. 
53. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 12. 
54.  FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 14. 
55. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 14. 
56. In this Article, the term “legal tender” is not used because it may be interpreted more 
narrowly, due to restrictions imposed in different countries on the use of certain forms of official 
currency. For example, in Australia, Australian cents are not considered legal tender if used in 
payments exceeding the maximum limits for coin payments (e.g., coins of the denomination of 
five, ten, twenty or fifty cents are considered legal tender only for payments not exceeding 
AUD$5 in total. See Currency Act 1965 (Cth) s 16.1(a) (Austl.). 
57. ADAM SMITH, On Money considered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of 
the Society, or of the Expense of maintaining the National Capital, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
58. GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 32 (1st ed. 1924). 
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The state (or chartalist) theory of money59 can be used to explain 
the operation of modern payment systems, including dematerialized 
money that exists only as account records.60 But the fundamentals of 
money circulation have not really changed: what serves as currency 
must generate sufficient public trust and demand among the end-users 
of the payment system. For commercial banks, such public trust and 
demand are based on the creditworthiness, liquidity and reputation of 
the relevant financial institution. The state, however, has a larger 
arsenal at its disposal. First, it has the instruments to generate artificial 
demand for its own liabilities (in the form of “official” currency), 
including the right to set restrictions on the types of currency it accepts 
in payments to itself (e.g., in tax collection)61 and the right to impose 
limitations on the circulation of other currencies (e.g., prohibition of 
foreign currency payments among residents62). Second, it sits atop the 
national currency pyramid and cannot be driven into involuntary 
default (as long as it only promises to redeem its own liabilities by 
payments in its own currency or to itself).63 
The emergence of new types of digital currencies is inextricably 
tied to the revisions of the international monetary system in the 
twentieth century. Following the 1944 Bretton Woods and 1976 
Jamaica reforms, chartalist currency (also commonly referred to as 
“fiat” currency) stopped being freely convertible into gold.64 In a world 
where official currencies—possessing neither inherent, nor fixed 
redemption value—form the core of the payment system, a search for 
 
59. It can be generally summarized by reference to Abba Lerner: “[W]hatever may have 
been the history of gold, at the present time, in a normally well-working economy, money is a 
creature of the state. Its general acceptability, which is its all-important attribute, stands or falls 
by its acceptability by the state.” Abba P. Lerner, Money as a Creature of the State, 37 AM. 
ECON. REV. 312, 313 (1947). 
60. For a more detailed discussion and variations of the state theory, see, e.g., JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY [1930] 2 (1976); Lerner, supra note 59, at 312. 
61. FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 639. 
62. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On Currency Regulation and Currency Control, 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2011, No 173-FZ, § 9(1) (prohibiting foreign currency operations 
among residents with certain exemptions). 
63.  FOX & ERNST, supra note 46, at 652. 
64. Individual states abandoned the precious metal standard at different time. For example, 
the Bank of England was relieved of its obligation to pay its own notes and Treasury notes in 
gold under the Gold Standard Act 1925. In Australia, the Commonwealth Bank Act 1929 gave 
the Treasurer authority to require mandatory exchange of precious metal coins or bullion into 
Australian notes. 
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alternative currencies was inevitable. The global financial crisis of 
2007-2008 merely intensified this search. 
Technological development, including the emergence of multiple 
public and private telecommunications networks, has resulted in 
proliferation of alternative privately issued payment instruments, 
including so-called “electronic money” and “virtual currencies.” Some 
have not been recognized as part of national payment systems65 (which 
comprise authorized institutions, infrastructure and regulated processes 
and are here called “formal” payment systems for short), thus creating 
what can be referred to as alternative (and unregulated) payment 
systems. In the following Parts IV and V, this Article examines the 
concept of currency through the lens of each type of payment system, 
starting with the formal one. 
IV. THE CONCEPT OF “CURRENCY” IN FORMAL PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS 
Of the three textbook functions of money (store of value,66 
medium of exchange,67 unit of account),68 the third one is definitive for 
a “formal” payment system: private parties may invest in different 
types of assets, from land to securities, to store value and individuals 
routinely engage in barter transactions, avoiding the use of any 
currency altogether. National and international payment systems, 
however, are unthinkable without a commonly accepted material or 
immaterial “referent” associated with each unit of account—a shared 
standard of value that is acceptable to all within a state or group of 
states. The necessary degree of acceptance is attributed by virtue of the 
law, which stipulates which instruments function as accepted media of 
exchange—the official currency.69 
 
65. In this Article, the term “payment systems” is interpreted broadly, as a defined set of 
institutions, instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of money. See EUROPEAN 
CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 17. 
66. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V, § 47 (1691). 
67. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of 
Money [1696], in LOCKE ON MONEY 410 (P.H. Kelly ed. 1991). 
68. For the standard definition of money as a unit of account, store of value, and medium 
of exchange, see, e.g., JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT AND CAPITAL 4 (1998). On the payment 
function of money, see Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money, 25 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 149 (2001). For a more detailed discussion on the various functions of 
money, see DAVIES, supra note 45, at 27-28. 
69. Regarding the United States, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C § 5103 (1965). Regarding the United 
Kingdom, see, e.g., Coinage Act 1971 c. 24, § 2 (Gr. Brit.). Regarding Australia, see, e.g., 
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Formal payment systems may differ from country to country both 
in terms of structure sophistication70 and underlying regulation. 
Despite existing differences, the common features can be summarized 
as follows. First, they utilize or are based upon official state currency, 
regardless of whether payments are made in cash (subject to any 
applicable upper limit of payment allowed for such transactions) or 
non-cash form.71 Second, a designated authority (usually a central 
bank) plays the key role in the design and operation of infrastructure 
within which its currency is used.72 Third, non-cash payments are 
predominantly performed via intermediaries, such as commercial 
banks (acting as account holders for clients and correspondents for 
other financial institutions) and specialized non-bank payment 
institutions.73 Fourth, non-bank actors are increasingly becoming part 
of the formal payment system, offering additional services and 
increasing the level of competition.74 
Over time, cash payments have been to a large extent replaced 
with non-cash alternatives (such as, credit transfers, direct debits, 
payment cards, checks, money orders, drafts, bills of exchange, letters 
of credit, etc.), which themselves are increasingly switching from 
physical to electronic platforms.75 Nonetheless, despite ongoing 
changes, the fundamentals of formal payment systems have remained 
 
Reserve Bank Act 1959 § 36(1) (Austl.). Regarding Israel, see, e.g., Bank of Israel Law 5714-
1954 § 30 (Isr.). 
70. In terms of structure, a formal payment system includes key processes (e.g., payment 
instruments, processing and settlement), institutions providing deposit and payment services to 
clients (e.g., banks) and facilitating clearing and settlement (e.g., interbank funds transfer 
systems), binding domestic and international rules, as well as soft law instruments, such as 
domestic industry self-regulation and international guidance and practices. See TOM KOKKOLA, 
THE PAYMENT SYSTEM, PAYMENTS, SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES, AND THE ROLE OF THE 
EUROSYSTEM 25-26 (2010). 
71. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK MONEY IN 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 1 (2003). 
72. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 19. 
73. See generally James Bullard & Bruce D. Smith, Intermediaries and Payment 
Instruments, 109 J. ECON. THEORY. 172 (2003). 
74. See generally Monzur Hossain & MD. Shahiduzzaman, Development of Non Bank 
Financial Institutions to Strengthen the Financial System of Bangladesh, 28 Q. J. BANGLADESH. 
INST. BANK. MGMT. 1 (2002). 
75. A 1994 article in Wired cites Microsoft’s former CTO Nathan Myhrvold: “Today we 
have a zillion different ways of doing financial transactions. There’s cash, checks, credit cards, 
debit cards, wiring money, traveler’s checks . . . each of these has a particular point. We’re going 
to see that much diversity in digital money.” See Steven Levy, E-Money (That’s What I Want), 
WIRED (Jan. 1, 1994), https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ [https://perma.cc/RS38-
TKPD]. See also KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 31-33. 
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largely the same: in most cases, new technologies merely add variety 
or enhance the efficiency of payment initiation or processing methods 
(e.g., e-invoicing or e-reconciliation). At their core, existing formal 
payment systems are still predominantly based on two types of money: 
official (national or regional) currency76 and its surrogates. These are 
discussed in Sections IV.A and IV.B, respectively.77 
A. Official currency: cash and bank accounts 
Even within the same country not all official national currency is 
created equal. Central banks sit atop the national currency pyramid, 
controlling the circulation of cash and the opening of central bank 
accounts.78 Liabilities of central banks involve no credit or liquidity 
risks, as the overall volume of currency issued by a central bank can be 
increased as necessary.79 For this reason, according to the international 
standards, payment obligations within systemically important payment 
systems should be settled using central bank accounts.80 By issuing 
cash, opening accounts and ensuring convertibility of other authorized 
forms of payment into their own liabilities, central banks preserve the 
uniform value of national currency, without which national currency 
cannot perform its key role in payments—as a unit of account.81 
In practice, the great majority of domestic payment systems settle 
using central bank accounts.82 In an international context involving 
settlement in multiple currencies, the settlement processes are 
invariably more complex—yet central bank accounts retain their 
importance, although to a lesser extent. For example, the Continuous 
Linked Settlement (“CLS”) system, which utilizes a dedicated third 
party—the CLS Bank—to perform settlement, relies on central banks 
 
76. A related term “legal tender” is not used in this Article. See supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
77.  See infra Section IV.A and IV.B. 
78. Currency issued by a central bank means, essentially, such central bank’s liabilities 
which have the function of a medium of exchange. These liabilities come in two forms 
(physical—cash, and digital—central bank accounts) and have five key characteristics: safety, 
availability, efficiency, neutrality and finality. See TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, THE EURO 
AND ITS CENTRAL BANK: GETTING UNITED AFTER THE UNION 123 (1st ed. 2004); see also 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 2.  
79. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 44. 
80. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems, BIS (Jan 2001) 8, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf. 
81. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 45. 
82. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at Annex 3 Table C. 
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to make all payments to and from the CLS.83 This is in contrast to other 
multicurrency settlement systems that perform settlement using 
commercial bank accounts.84 
While it can be said that commercial banks85 also “create” official 
currency by issuing loans,86 they are limited in performing this function 
by several factors: the law generally precludes uncontrolled lending by 
establishing mandatory ratios (e.g., capital adequacy ratios) and by 
otherwise restricting leverage (not to mention economic factors, such 
as central banks’ interest rate policies).87 Similarly to central bank 
money balances, a client account with a commercial bank is essentially 
a liability of the latter.88 This liability, however, is of a lower quality 
than a central bank liability, as its originator can mismatch its liquidity 
and obligations or otherwise default. For this reason, countries develop 
additional instruments to increase public trust in commercial banks, by 
establishing deposit insurance and oversight mechanisms, by reserving 
resolution powers in the event of financial distress and by adopting 
other regulatory measures. 
 
83. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3. 
84.  BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3. 
85. In some jurisdictions, loans can be issued by other financial institutions that may not 
have the status of a “bank.” For example, in Russia, microloans can be provided by 
“microfinance organisations.” See The Russian Federal Law On Microfinance Activity and 
Microfinance Organisations, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2010, No 151-FZ, § 2. As these institutions are 
generally subject to similar, but often more relaxed (due to their smaller size and impact), 
regulatory requirements, in this Article the term “commercial banks” is interpreted broadly to 
include all financial institutions authorized to issue loans and make deposits in official currency 
by making records in their own, rather than third party accounts nominated in official currency. 
86. While various theories provide different views on this issue (e.g., the financial 
intermediation theory, the fractional reserve theory and the credit creation theory), in his recent 
study, Werner empirically demonstrates that “each individual bank creates credit and money out 
of nothing.” See Richard Werner, Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing – The 
Theories and the Empirical Evidence, 36 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS, 1, 16 (2014); see also 
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, THE ROLE OF BANKS, NON-BANKS AND THE CENTRAL BANK IN THE 
MONEY CREATION PROCESS (2017). 
87.  See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: international regulatory 
framework for banks, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/8XZ8-UJCS]. 
88. This is settled both in legal theory and practice. See, e.g., Libyan Arab Foreign Bank 
v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728, 21 (treating the fact that a customer “does not own any 
money in a bank” and has merely “a personal right” (i.e., a claim) against the bank as “hornbook 
law”) (citing Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 H.L.Cas. 28, 36 (“Money, when paid into a bank, ceases 
altogether to be the money of the principal . . . it is then the money of the banker, who is bound 
to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for 
it . . . The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of 
the banker, to do with as he pleases.”)). 
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A combination of cash and accounts opened by central and 
commercial banks is the sine qua non of modern formal payment 
systems recognized by most central banks.89 In this layered system, 
non-financial institutions hold their liquidity with commercial banks, 
and commercial banks hold their own liquidity with their central 
banks.90 Except for cash, which serves as the only freely available type 
of currency issued by central banks, the only other way for most 
organizations and individuals91 to own official currency is through 
intermediaries, namely commercial banks—the same institutions that 
can create new money out of “thin air.”92 
Despite the advantages of official currency issued directly by a 
central bank, its use remains limited. First, transactions in its physical 
form (cash) are generally restricted in terms of size (e.g., up to a certain 
limit)93 and of transacting parties (e.g., cash transactions among legal 
entities can be prohibited). Second, in most cases its digital form is only 
accessible to certain (usually the largest) banks94 and non-bank 
financial institutions (e.g., clearing houses), as well as selected non-
commercial entities (e.g., the government, foreign central banks and 
international organizations).95 Third, commercial bank accounts offer 
advantages that could overshadow the underlying risks (e.g., 
multicurrency and cross-border payments, increased competition, 
diversification of payment systems, access to credit, etc.), not to 
 
89. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 1. 
90. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 2. This description is 
overly simplified, since developed financial systems with multiple banks of different sizes 
routinely use a combination of central bank money and commercial bank money for payments 
in domestic and foreign currency. It is common for smaller financial institutions with 
correspondent accounts at the same top-tier bank to settle without using central bank money at 
all. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3. 
91. While individuals are commonly precluded from opening accounts directly with a 
central bank, certain exceptions exist (but remain quite rare). One such exception has recently 
been eliminated in the UK, where employees at the Bank of England used to have the privilege 
of having direct accounts with the central bank. See Gwyn Topham, Bank of England to Close 
Personal Banking Service for Employees, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/17/bank-of-england-closing-personal-
banking-service-employees [https://perma.cc/3CGL-6CBW]. 
92. Werner, supra note 86; DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 86. 
93. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
94. Relevant policies differ from country to country. For example, the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority strongly encourages all banks to have a settlement account with it. See 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4. 
95. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 3-4. 
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mention deposit insurance that provides sufficient security for a large 
portion of account holders.96 
B. Surrogates of Official Currency 
The level of competition within payment systems has increased 
over time. Where banks were unable to offer sufficient territorial 
coverage or competitive prices for their services, other businesses 
stepped in to close the gap. Of course, these businesses could not issue 
official currency, which remained the prerogative of banks. Instead, 
non-banks started offering their own liabilities, trying to make them 
more attractive to clients by allowing convertibility of such liabilities 
into official currency. Thus privately issued surrogates of official 
currency (“SOC”) came into being.97 Where they were more accessible 
than bank accounts and more efficient than cash, these surrogates had 
a very positive effect on financial inclusion.98 
SOC have different names in different jurisdictions: “mobile 
money” or “e-money” in Kenya,99 “electronic money” in the European 
Union,100 “purchased payment facility”101 in Australia, “electronic 
monetary funds” in Russia.102 All these concepts have two things in 
common: (i) they represent a promise by a recipient of official currency 
(the issuer) to follow the payment instructions of the person which has 
provided that official currency (the client) and (ii) payment instructions 
from the client do not have to be submitted alongside the official 
 
96. See EUROPEAN REPO COUNCIL, THE INTERCONNECTIVITY OF CENTRAL AND 
COMMERCIAL BANK MONEY IN THE CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN REPO 
MARKET 9-11 (2011). 
97. Characterisation of units of value as “surrogates” can be found in paragraph 13 of the 
Preamble to the EU Directive 2009/110/EC. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267), 
Preamble ¶ 13. 
98. A prominent example is Kenya and its dominant SOC platform M-Pesa. See Anton 
Didenko, Regulating FinTech: Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 311, 362 (2018). 
99. See, e.g., COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF KENYA, FIRST QUARTER SECTOR 
STATISTICS REPORT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2017/2018 13 (2017); CENTRAL BANK OF 
KENYA, E-MONEY REGULATION (2013). FATF also uses the term ‘e-money’ and defines it as 
“a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated in fiat 
currency.” See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 4. 
100. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 2.2.  
101. Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) s 9 (Austl.). 
102. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 3.18.  
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currency.103 Although the resemblance with bank deposits is striking, 
the key difference is that the issuer’s liability is not recorded in a bank 
account. This remains true regardless of whether the issuer is a bank or 
not.104 
At the same time, the type of account alone cannot be 
determinative. After all, many organizations (e.g., brokers, clearing 
organizations, fund managers) can intermediate their customer funds 
and for this purpose also maintain internal accounting systems. Unlike 
other forms of intermediation, however, SOC issuers open client 
accounts for the sole purpose of facilitating payments, by offering units 
in their own accounts – and not in the accounts of banks – as a medium 
of exchange.105 
1. Differences from Official Currency 
This use of separate units of account instead of official currency 
is a defining feature of a SOC, which helps to differentiate SOC from 
a range of other payment mechanisms that do not involve the creation 
of, and payment in, non-official currency units. This would be the 
situation when a payment service provider acts as agent on behalf of 
clients to store official currency on their (rather than the agent’s) behalf 
and fulfil client payment orders.106 Similarly, if a payment facility, 
however called, operates by providing remote access to a bank account, 
it also does not establish a different medium of exchange and, as a 
result, a different currency. This distinction becomes especially 
important in the context of SOCs offered by banks that can – but should 
 
103. The time lag implies that, in addition to making payments, a SOC issuer also performs 
a form of intermediation by storing the value overtime. This is in contrast to money transfer 
service providers which do not perform the storage function. 
104. This is clear from the Russian Federal Law “On the National Payment System,” 
which requires all corporate clients of issuers of electronic means of payment either to open a 
separate bank account with the issuer (provided that such issuer is a bank, otherwise it would 
have no authority to open one), or to provide to the issuer the details of its third party bank 
account. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 7.23. 
105. Id. at §12.3. 
106. In the past, PayPal operated in the United States as an agent for its clients, offering 
its clients two different services: (i) custody of funds in PayPal’s accounts, and (ii) transferring 
funds from those accounts in accordance with the clients’ instructions. See Paypal, User 
Agreement for Paypal Service, SEC (Nov. 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1314052/000131405205000004/ex105a.htm [https://perma.cc/7FB3-52DY]. 
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not be – confused with currency in bank accounts. Let us consider 
evidence found in the law applicable to SOC. 
First, deposit insurance protections do not apply to non-bank 
accounts and, consequently, do not safeguard holders of SOC balances, 
at least directly.107 The only potential exception known to us might be 
the recently announced pass-through of deposit insurance by PayPal 
for select users of its new services.108 A number of jurisdictions have 
implemented creative workarounds to promote customer trust in SOC, 
such as a duty of the SOC issuer (or its counterparty) to hold liquid 
assets (e.g., in the form of official currency) in a bank (commonly 
referred to as “float”).109 In some jurisdictions the float must be held 
on trust for the benefit of the SOC issuer’s account holders.110 
However, these measures do not change the key mechanics, whereby 
deposit insurance does not apply to non-bank accounts. Furthermore, 
such protection is fundamentally different from deposit insurance. The 
latter kicks in regardless of the status of the asset structure of an 
insolvent bank: for all intents and purposes, there could be zero assets 
to repay any depositors, but deposit insurance will compensate each of 
them, depending on its terms (e.g., subject to the maximum amount 
established by the law).111 If an SOC issuer goes into bankruptcy and 
the float held on trust for the clients remains untouched, the clients will 
recover up to their respective proportion of the float.112 Assuming no 
restrictions on the number of units of SOC held by each customer, this 
could potentially113 mean recovery of sums exceeding a deposit 
insurance cap. But so long as control of the account remains in the 
 
107. See The Russian Federal Law On the Insurance Deposits of Individuals in Banks of 
the Russian Federation, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2003, No. 177-FZ, § 5.2.5. 
108. At the time of writing, this project was still in a testing (“beta”) phase. See Bill Ready, 
Taking Further Steps to Help the Unbanked, PAYPAL (April 2018), https://www.paypal.com/
stories/us/taking-further-steps-to-help-the-unbanked [https://perma.cc/7RF6-EH3Z]. It is 
unclear how the pass-through of FDIC insurance will be implemented in practice. 
109. See, e.g., CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, cl. 8. 
110. See Jonathan Greenacre & Ross P. Buckley, Using Trusts to Protect Mobile Money 
Customers, SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 59-78 (2014). 
111. This does not mean, however, that an SOC issuer will necessarily be deemed less 
reliable compared to a commercial bank. In countries where banking is deemed inefficient or 
too expensive, an SOC offered by a leading and well-respected mobile operator is likely to be 
widely favoured by the population. This was the situation with M-Pesa when it was launched by 
Safaricom in Kenya in 2007. 
112.  See Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 110, at 67-69. 
113. This is unlikely in practice, given that generally SOC balances are lower than 
commercial bank deposits. 
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hands of the SOC issuer,114 the trust’s effectiveness is limited to 
situations when such issuer has not already misappropriated the float. 
This is somewhat similar to the requirement that brokers hold client 
funds separately from their own – practice shows that, in financially 
difficult times, the temptation to use segregated funds may be too 
strong.115 Other protective measures, such as contractual arrangements 
between an SOC issuer and the bank holding the float, are even less 
effective than a trust structure – and for this reason their comparison to 
deposit insurance is less germane.116 
Second, issuers of SOC are commonly prevented from engaging 
in lending activities.117 Lending in this context clearly refers to the 
 
114. In theory, it is possible to implement a range of protections to put some distance 
between an SOC issuer and the float. Some regulators even offer a differentiated approach based 
on the nature of this connection. For example, the liquidity requirements listed in Australia’s 
Prudential Standard APS 610 ‘Prudential Requirements for Providers of Purchased Payment 
Facilities’ do not apply to PPFs that do not hold ‘stored value at risk’, which is the case, inter 
alia, when: (i) the funds received in exchange for PPF balances are deposited in an account with 
an authorised deposit taking institution (ADI), (ii) the PPF provider has no operational control 
over such account and (iii) no creditors aside from beneficiaries of the stored value can have 
legal recourse to the asset in that account in the event of insolvency or winding up of activities 
of the PPF provider. See Prudential Standard APS 610 § 7. Despite clear policy reasons behind 
such differentiated approach, it is very difficult to imagine a situation when all of these 
requirements will be met. In fact, back in 2005 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) attempted to provide a corresponding example, which involved two companies splitting 
different functions among themselves (Company A acting as the provider of the PPF facility, 
and Company B controlling the relevant deposit account with an ADI to make payments out of 
it). See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Authorisation and Prudential Supervision 
of Providers of Purchased Payment Facilities (Discussion Paper May 2005) 4, 
http://www.gtm.apra.gov.au/adi/Documents/ADI-Supervision-of-PPFs-May-2005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8VC-CUSL]. Unfortunately, even in this hypothetical scenario with split 
functions and responsibility, Company A would almost certainly have a contractual arrangement 
with Company B whereby the latter should honor all of Company A’s instructions relating to 
the use of the deposit account with an ADI—in which case Company A remains in control of 
the account, albeit indirectly. 
115. A prominent example is the case of bankruptcy of MF Global Inc, which—in the face 
of financial difficulties—"unlawfully used nearly one billion dollars of customer segregated 
funds to support its own proprietary operations and the operations of its affiliates.” See U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-cv-7866 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2016) (order granting consent order for preliminary injunction, civil monetary 
penalty and other equitable relief against defendant). 
116. See Ramos, Solana, Buckley & Greenacre, supra note 4, at 724-25. 
117. See CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, at cl. 7.6. In a similar fashion, but 
using different terminology, Russian law does not allow operators of electronic monetary funds 
‘to provide to the client monetary funds for the purposes of increasing the client’s balance of 
electronic monetary funds, on the basis of consumer credit agreement’. See The Russian Federal 
Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 7.5. 
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increase of SOC balances not backed by a commensurate contribution 
of official currency by the client,118 rather than creation of new official 
currency.119 After all, non-banks cannot create official currency 
directly, and so there is no good policy reason to allow them to create 
it indirectly, by issuing surrogates freely exchangeable into official 
currency. With banks, however, the situation is more complicated, 
since even a prohibition on lending strictly in the context of issuing 
SOC, even if carefully worded, will be extremely difficult to observe. 
The problem is that the fungibility of value stored in bank accounts 
makes it extremely difficult to track individual units of official 
currency underlying a payment transaction to their source. With cash, 
such tracking is outright impossible for bank notes and coins, provided 
that individual note numbers are not recorded and tracked. With bank 
accounts, which merely represent electronic records, the tracking can 
be only circumstantial. 
Despite these difficulties, however, it appears to be technically 
possible to track a breach of the lending prohibition in respect of SOC 
in a situation when (i) a bank (“Bank”) credits official currency to a 
bank account (“Account”) of its client (“Client”) as a loan (“Loan”), 
(ii) the Client requests the Bank to issue SOC in exchange for some or 
all of the balance of the Account, and at the same time (iii) the 
following equation is satisfied: 
X > A + B, if W = 0 or 
X > A + B, if L > W > 0, 
where 
X – the amount of official currency in the Account exchanged by 
the Client for SOC; 
A – the amount of official currency in the Account prior to the 
issuance of the Loan; 
B – the amount of official currency credited to the Account after 
the issuance of the Loan but before the reduction of the Client’s 
balance by the Bank for the purpose of issuing SOC (assuming that 
neither A, nor B includes loans issued by the Bank); 
 
118. Clearly, a lending prohibition cannot relate to bank accounts, as it would make no 
sense for banks issuing SOC. 
119. Since SOC balances are redeemable in official currency, then the creation of SOC 
balances on loan would indirectly lead to the increase in the volume of official currency in 
operation. 
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L – amount of the Loan; and 
W – amount of official currency withdrawn from the Account after 
the issuance of the Loan but before the reduction of the Client’s 
balance by the Bank for the purpose of issuing SOC. 
As is seen from the equation, the amount of the loan in question 
is irrelevant – what matters is whether the same currency was used to 
issue SOC. Due to inherent fungibility, currency can only be tracked in 
this manner using the bank account indirectly, by comparing the loan 
amount with the sums received from other sources. 
Third, payments with SOC require dedicated know-your-
customer (“KYC”) procedures that are similar to, but remain separate 
from, bank account checks.120 
Fourth, payments with SOC are made using accounts of the SOC 
issuer, rather than the accounts of any third party, such as the bank that 
holds the float.121 This remains true even when the SOC issuer engages 
a third party.122 
Fifth, even in jurisdictions with dedicated SOC regulation where 
units of SOC can be used to fulfil payment obligations,123 the law 
neither recognizes SOC as legal tender124 (the latter remains the 
prerogative of official currency), nor permits payments to the state to 
be made in units of SOC.125 
It is clear from the discussion above that SOC indeed form a 
separate medium of exchange. This said, SOC do not compete with 
official currency as such. Instead, they only compete with other 
payment mechanisms.126 In EU law, SOC units have been expressly 
recognized as a standalone media of exchange distinct from other forms 
of currency: in 2012 Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 was amended by 
clarifying that “electronic money” forms a standalone sub-category of 
 
120. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 10.  
121. Id. at § 7.10. 
122. Id. at § 13.4. 
123. Id. at §§ 7.17 – 7.18. 
124. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GK RF] [Civil Code] § 140 (Russ.). 
125. See Nalogovyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [NK RF] [Tax Code] § 45.3 (Russ.). 
126. See CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, supra note 99, cl. 4 (stating that “currency” includes 
“e-money” for the purposes of the definition of “payment instrument”). 
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“funds,” alongside banknotes, coins and “scriptural money.”127 At the 
same time, “payment transactions transferring electronic money” were 
expressly carved out from the regulation of other payment transactions 
using credit and direct debit, due to the specific legal nature of SOC 
units: the carve-out applies where payment transactions are settled only 
using “electronic money” and is not applied when “such transactions 
result in a credit transfer or direct debit to and from a payment account 
identified by BBAN or IBAN.”128 Equally important is the very 
definition of “electronic money” in Article 2(2) of the EU Directive 
2009/110/EC as “electronically . . . stored monetary value,” which 
shows that units of “electronic money” themselves possess a monetary 
value of their own. This value is based on the convertibility into official 
currency but is clearly separate from the value of units of official 
currency. 
Legal differences, in turn, lead to differences in utility and usage 
models. On the one hand, the SOC business model is built around the 
medium of exchange function of SOC units. According to the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”), “PPF providers 
primarily earn fees from services linked to facilitating the function of 
money as a medium of exchange, not through making advances of 
money.”129 On the other hand, SOC offer only rudimentary 
functionality as a store of value, due to existing restrictions on balances 
held as SOC and prohibitions on the payment of interest.130 
2. Connection to Official Currency 
Let us now consider the close connection of SOC to official 
currency—a factor that categorizes this medium of exchange as a 
surrogate, rather than as a standalone alternative currency.131 
First, existing SOC schemes do not alter the supply of official 
currency. SOC do not alter the fundamental mechanics of the payment 
 
127. See Regulation 260/2012, art. 17(1), 2012 O.J. (L 94) 33-34 (establishing technical 
and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation 
924/2009, 2012 O.J. (L 94)).  
128. Id. at art. 1(2)(f). 
129. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, supra note 114, at 5. APRA further 
explains that, consequently, stored value is “largely a residue of the services provided,” rather 
than a source of funding for other operations. See Id. 
130. In a number of jurisdictions payments of interest on SOC balances have been 
permitted. For more detail, see Malady, Tsang & Buckley, supra note 4. 
131. For a discussion on alternative currencies and their classification, see infra Section 
V. 
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system built around official currencies. Although SOC represent a 
separate medium of exchange, units of SOC can only be obtained in 
exchange for official currency (they cannot be lent).132 Similarly, these 
units can exit the internal accounting system of the SOC issuer by 
exchange into official currency. These exchanges are done at par or at 
least at par.133 
Second, SOC regulations frequently mirror regulations governing 
bank deposits.134 
Third, SOC are becoming increasingly associated with the formal 
financial system. A prominent example is the World Bank’s Findex 
database which counts as financially excluded, people “without an 
account at a financial institution or through a mobile money 
provider.”135 Another example is the newly adopted Fifth AML 
Directive, which treats “electronic money” as a type of fiat currency, 
alongside “coins and banknotes that are designated as legal tender.”136 
3. SOC as Part of the Formal Payment System 
Over time, SOC systems have matured and are now exhibiting 
even more similarities with regular bank accounts. Some SOC projects 
have evolved to provide greater credibility in the eyes of prospective 
users (e.g., by establishing trust facilities to safeguard customers 
against the insolvency of the SOC issuer).137 Although historically 
SOC products were not interest-bearing, the situation is beginning to 
change, further reducing the gap between bank accounts and SOC 
accounts.138 As the gap is reducing, so are SOC products becoming part 
 
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
133. See Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 11. 
134. See The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ, § 10.11 (providing that interruption of payments using electronic 
monetary funds is permitted in cases and in the manner that are analogous to those applicable to 
bank accounts). 
135. ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, ET AL., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017: MEASURING 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 4 (2018). 
136. See Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (amending Directive 2015/849, 2015 O.J. 
(L 141)); Directive 2009/138/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 335); Directive 2013/36/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 176), 
Preamble ¶ 8. This is done to contrast SOC with so-called “virtual currencies.” 
137. See Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 110. For a discussion on alternative protection 
mechanisms in the context of Civil Law jurisdictions, which do not recognize the concept of 
trust, see Ramos, Solana, Buckley & Greenacre, supra note 4. 
138. Tanzania’s Tigo Pesa is arguably the first interest-earning e-money product. See 
Tsang, Malady & Buckley, supra note 4. Although the same is not true for the United Kingdom 
and the United States, payment of interest is a defining feature of a bank deposit in certain 
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of existing formal payments systems. After all, both (bank and SOC 
accounts) are pursuing the common goal of ensuring greater inclusion 
of domestic actors in the formal payment system based on official 
currency to minimize the risks associated with cash-based payments 
and give the regulators a better grasp or financial flows in the economy 
(among other underlying factors). 
The notion of public trust remains just as important for SOC as 
for bank currency (i.e., deposits) but is generated through different 
channels. In the case of a bank account, client security is achieved 
through licensing requirements, deposit insurance schemes, and 
resolution powers over banks in case of financial distress. The same 
protections do not always apply to SOC providers. First, in most 
jurisdictions regulators do not have special resolution powers in the 
event of financial difficulties of SOC issuers (as opposed to distressed 
commercial banks, which can be subject to a variety of recovery 
procedures, from management replacement, to the transfer of toxic 
assets to a third party).139 Second, since deposit insurance rules do not 
always apply to SOC issuers,140 the latter are often forced to adopt other 
measures to ensure that their own insolvency does not adversely affect 
their client’s money.141 
This functional similarity to bank deposits can also help to explain 
why—despite a variety of attempts—SOC systems have been largely 
unsuccessful (with some notable exceptions). The two business models 
(SOC and electronic banking) are commonly engaged in direct 
competition, which often precludes the development of SOC in 
countries with established banking systems (this is generally due to 
high costs of implementation and also competition from incumbent 
financial institutions).142 A prime example is Australia, where after 
almost ten years only PayPal is the only PPF provider to have been 
registered. Notable exceptions can be found in countries with large 
numbers of unbanked people, where SOC can become a viable 
alternative to a bank account: in Kenya, the mobile money platform M-
Pesa became an instrument of financial inclusion for the majority of the 
 
jurisdictions. For an example in Russia, see The Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 
GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] § 834, ¶ 1. 
139. Kenya is a notable exception. See Kemp & Buckley, supra note 4, at 1551-52. 
140. See, e.g., Juan Carlos Izaguirre, Claire McGuire & Dave Grace, Deposit Insurance 
for Digital Financial Products: 3 Approaches, CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/blog/deposit-
insurance-digital-financial-products-3-approaches [https://perma.cc/83SD-XAWX]. 
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
142. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 33-34. 
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population at a time when formal banking was perceived as expensive, 
time-consuming and generally inaccessible.143 Similarly high levels of 
impact from SOCs has been seen in Tanzania, Uganda, the Philippines, 
and other countries.144 
C. Development trends in formal payment systems 
Formal payment systems are continuously evolving. Recent 
trends include the following. 
- Technological advancement and increasing complexity. 
Developments in technology have made possible the 
establishment and widespread adoption of real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) systems where each payment is settled intra-
day in real-time (as opposed to settlement of net positions at the 
end of a specified period).145 Wholesale settlement requires a 
substantially larger money pool to operate efficiently, and thus 
generally utilizes central bank money (in terms of accounts used 
for settling payment obligations and intra-day loans provided by 
central banks).146 At the same time, the speed of technological 
development tends to reduce the payment system’s lifecycle: many 
existing wholesale payment systems are programmed in obsolete 
languages or use outdated database designs.147 The process of 
modernisation of existing payment systems and development of 
new ones148 creates a fertile ground for the adoption of new 
technologies, such as distributed ledger technology (DLT): a 
 
143. For an overview of the challenges associated with Kenya’s banking sector, see 
EMCompass, How Fintech is Reaching the Poor in Africa and Asia: A Start-Up Perspective, 
IFC (Mar. 2017), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f745fd31-a9aa-4736-b0ba-
4ac2956f96dc/EmCompass+Note+34+DFS+and+FinTech+Mar+28+FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPE
RES [https://perma.cc/85AN-UHYN]. 
144.  Tavneet Suri, Mobile Money, 9 ANN. REV. ECON, 497, 506-08 (2017). 
145. See, for example, CHAPS in the UK, RITS in Australia. 
146. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4. 
147. Bech & Garratt, supra note 6, at 66. 
148. For an example of a recent initiative to modernize the national payment system, see, 
e.g., News Release, Bank of England, A Blueprint for a New RTGS Service for the United 
Kingdom (May 9, 2017), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2017/may/
a-blueprint-for-a-new-rtgs-service-for-the-united-kingdom.pdf?la=en&hash=C3C5EFE19203
BBEDF725BEFB6D45CFDC0504D6FE [https://perma.cc/P7D9-FV7R]. Another example 
comes from Australia, which launched a New Payments Platform in February 2018 “to provide 
a platform for innovation and competition in the provision of payment services.” See Reserve 
Bank of Australia, Launch of the New Payments Platform, (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2018/mr-18-02.html [https://perma.cc/HFJ2-8V87]. 
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number of central banks have already completed proofs of concept 
for DLT applications.149 
- Concentration of payment system risks. For various reasons 
(e.g. business specialization or bank consolidation) individual 
financial institutions end up concentrating significant volumes of 
payment activities, sometimes equalling in scope the size of entire 
payment systems of certain countries. This prompts central banks 
to react and to revise their approach to payment systems, e.g. by 
creating more competitive settlement mechanisms or enhancing 
oversight of systemically important institutions.150 In the long 
term, in such cases, central banks might consider taking over the 
payment settlement process to prevent further consolidation of 
risks. 
- Increasing demand for central bank accounts and services. 
Increased cross-border flows of money resulting from financial 
globalisation and the establishment of settlement facilities 
operating with multiple currencies imposes additional pressure on 
central banks, such as the need for greater access to intraday credit. 
In addition, non-bank financial institutions (and some non-
financial institutions) are requesting broader access to central bank 
accounts and operations in central bank money, as well as to 
improve the services utilising central bank money (by allowing 
longer operating hours, multicurrency functionality or 
otherwise).151 
Overall, formal payment systems are predominantly operating as 
multi-level domestic and cross-border payment systems dominated by 
intermediaries (both nationally and internationally). These 
intermediaries are typically commercial banks but also include front-
end, back-end, and end-to-end providers, as well as operators of retail 
payment infrastructure.152 These systems are given official status by 
dedicated laws and regulations.153 High volumes of foreign exchange 
 
149. Bech & Garratt, supra note 6, at 66. 
150. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 4-5. 
151. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 5, 43; see also ITU-
T FOCUS GROUP ON DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, ACCESS TO PAYMENT INFRASTRUCTURES 
(2016), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/focusgroups/dfs/Documents/09_2016/Access%20to%20
Payment%20Infrastructures.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT64-WNAX]. 
152. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, NON-BANKS IN RETAIL PAYMENTS 
9 (2014). 
153. See, e.g., The Russian Federal Law On the National Payment System, SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2011, No 161-FZ. 
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operations and the emergence of major financial institutions engaged 
in cross-border transactions154 drive financial internationalization, 
which, nonetheless, remains largely decentralized and based on 
correspondent accounts with commercial banks.155 New technologies, 
like DLT, offer alluring prospects of resolving some of the existing 
issues (such as high infrastructure costs relating to cross-border 
payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance)156 and attract 
significant attention, but so far appear a somewhat distant 
opportunity.157  
V. THE CONCEPT OF “CURRENCY” IN ALTERNATIVE 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
The unit of account function of currency used in a formal payment 
system is maintained through guaranteed conversion of recognized 
forms of currency into central bank liabilities.158 This ensures the 
overall stability of the system and public trust in formal fiat currency, 
which is, of course, intrinsically worthless. By necessity, such a system 
functions in a closed loop, covering only those types of currency which 
are accepted by the law. In contrast, “alternative payment systems” 
operate outside such a loop and cover those processes, institutions, and 
practices, which are not based on cash, central bank, or commercial 
bank accounts and are thus conceived as standalone systems. As a 
result, these systems can be expressly prohibited by law or, to take 
another extreme, be subject to no specific rules at all. 
Alternative payment systems operate within dedicated user 
groups (e.g., virtual communities159 or users of a particular electronic 
protocol) and utilize alternative currency units instead of official state 
currency for settlement purposes.160 Payment systems established by 
 
154. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 61. 
155. KOKKOLA, supra note 70, at 62. 
156. A recent report by Santander InnoVentures, Oliver Wyman, and Anthemis Group 
projects the pertinent savings from the application of distributed ledger technology in the region 
of US$15-20 billion per annum by 2022. See MARIANO BELINKY, EMMET RENNICK & ANDREW 
VEITCH, THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES 15 (2015). 
157. See, e.g., Chris Skinner, Applying Blockchain to Clearing and Settlement, BANKNXT 
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://banknxt.com/57632/blockchain-clearing-and-settlement/ 
[https://perma.cc/7PLN-Z3WR]. 
158. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
159. A virtual community can be defined as ‘a place within cyberspace where individuals 
interact and follow mutual interests or goals’. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 
8, at 11. 
160. There is no uniform classification of these units. See infra Section V.A. 
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such user groups often resemble their “formal” counterparts: they can 
be subject to the same kinds of risks,161 and the level of acceptance of 
settlement units used in these systems depends on the level of public 
trust attributable to them by end-users. The special characteristics of 
alternative currency units utilized as a medium of exchange, however, 
make alternative payment systems quite distinct. First, since the 
settlement unit is the alternative currency itself (as opposed to official 
currency),162 finality and irrevocability of payments cannot be 
guaranteed as a matter of law. Second, while some methods of 
achieving end users’ demand for virtual currencies can be quite similar 
to those applied in a formal payment system (e.g., the developers of a 
computer game may require all payments among players to be 
performed in a single, specially created virtual currency),163 others 
focus on the perceived advantages of such currencies, such as 
anonymity or pseudonymity (compared with bank accounts), 
settlement speed (compared with  foreign exchange retail banking 
transactions), or lack of regulatory oversight.164 
A. Taxonomy of Alternative Currencies 
In this Article, the words “alternative currency” are used with a 
broad meaning, to cover the whole array of currencies operating outside 
the formal payment system. This is in contrast to the existing literature, 
which largely focuses on specific currencies or even currency groups, 
but does not provide a comprehensive picture. For example, in recent 
years, a lot of attention has been dedicated to the terms “virtual 
 
161. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 40. 
162. See supra Section IV.A. 
163. Compare the official state currency authorized by law to be used for the settlement 
of debts. This said, even computer game economies find their way into the formal payment 
system, albeit often in violation of terms of use, which prohibit transactions with “real” money. 
See, e.g., Blizzard Entertainment, Blizzard Termination of Service Agreement, BLIZZARD ENT.,  
https://www.blizzard.com/en-sg/legal/b8a1574a-8137-44ad-acf0-11c92e90b26f/blizzard-
termination-of-service-agreement [https://perma.cc/PAW3-F2BE]; see also infra note 182. 
164. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 18-19. Some of these 
perceived advantages have already caused serious concern among regulators across the globe. 
See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 30-32. 
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currency”165 and “digital currency”166 (and their classification). Both 
terms are rather unfortunate, however. The former accurately reflects 
the fact that many alternative currencies operate within virtual 
communities (like computer games or social networks) but does not sit 
well with the fact that units like Bitcoin are commonly used in real-life 
economy transactions. The latter term, digital currency, addresses this 
inconsistency but creates another: currency used in “formal” payment 
systems is also predominantly digital167 and exists in the form of 
account records, so the distinction appears somewhat contrived. 
Needless to say, occasionally one term is replaced with the other, with 
the only increase being in terms of obfuscation.168 In other cases, one 
of the terms is simply not used to avoid confusion with the other.169 In 
addition, existing classifications are frequently incomplete, as they do 
not include so-called “complementary” (or “community”) currencies or 
focus on non-physical currencies, particularly in the light of the recent 
explosion of so-called “cryptocurrencies” (a misnomer discussed in 
Section V.A.4 below).170 Any taxonomy excluding these latter 
categories is incomplete. 
There are many ways to classify alternative currencies. This 
Article will consider three key universal criteria in Sections V.A.1 to 
V.A.3 and will then discuss the special characteristics of the new group 
of alternative currencies inspired by Bitcoin (in Section V.A.4).171 
1. Physical or Digital? 
The vast majority of alternative currency types are digital. 
However, exceptions still exist. First, in a number of regions across the 
 
165. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
2015, supra note 12. European Banking Authority, EBA Opinion on “Virtual Currencies,” EBA 
(July 4, 2014), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8FJ-LT2G]; INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2016); US 
Department of Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra note 15. 
166. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 1; Barrdear & Kumhof, 
supra note 6; Max Raskin & David Yermack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and 
the Future of Central Banking (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
22238, 2016), https://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Raskin_Max_and_Yermack_David_
The%20Future%20of%20Central%20Banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR7E-Q6QJ]. 
167. See Desjardins, supra note 7. 
168. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 1, n.2. 
169. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 4. 
170.  See infra Section V.A.4. 
171.  See infra Sections V.A.1-4. 
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globe, tribes and other local groups continue to rely on archaic 
currencies like seashells.172 Second, physical alternative currencies in 
the form of paper notes are used today by local communities in major 
countries like the United Kingdom.173 Third, there is nothing 
precluding a group of people from using virtually any medium as a 
currency in transactions among them. 
Physical community currencies, like the Bristol Pound,174 are 
particularly interesting, since they operate in countries with well-
established and highly sophisticated payment infrastructures. 
Furthermore, there are attempts to integrate these currencies into the 
existing payment system, at least at a local level (e.g., by ensuring their 
exchangeability into official currency175 or allowing payment of local 
taxes using community currency).176 
2. Convertible or Non-convertible? 
“Virtual” or “digital” currencies177 are often classified on the basis 
of the convertibility criterion.178 The same approach can be applied to 
all alternative currencies. Thus, in terms of convertibility into 
 
172. For example, this is the case in the Solomon Islands, where strings of polished 
seashells are accepted by merchants. See Pei-yi Guo, From Currency to Agency: Shell Money in 
Contemporary Langalanga, Solomon Islands, ACADEMIA, https://www.academia.edu/1613812/
From_Currency_to_Agency_Shell_Money_in_Contemporary_Langalanga_Solomon_Islands 
[https://perma.cc/9SHE-A2FZ]. For a more recent description, see Nick Sas, These Pacific 
Islanders Are Betting on a Seashell Currency Boom, VICE (Jan. 11 2018), 
https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/paqmx7/these-pacific-islanders-are-betting-on-a-shell-
money-boom [https://perma.cc/75DH-WT4Y]. 
173. See infra note 174. 
174. There are a number of similar projects. For examples of projects in the UK, see 
TOTNES POUND, https://www.totnespound.org/ [https://perma.cc/NZZ2-N52S]; LEWES POUND, 
https://www.thelewespound.org/ [https://perma.cc/9RGH-FD6P]; EXETER POUND, 
http://www.exeterpound.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/2KA8-HD5Q]; CARDIFF POUND, 
http://cardiffpound.co.uk/ [https://perma.cc/77AG-2C7X]; BRIXTON POUND, 
http://brixtonpound.org/ [https://perma.cc/FNU6-BWZ8]. 
175.  See infra note 190-92 and accompanying text. 
176.  For example, the council tax in Bristol can be paid in Bristol Pounds. See 
https://bristolpound.org/pay-council-tax-business-rates-bristol-pounds/ [https://perma.cc/78Y4-
JHZV].  
177. See supra notes 165-66. 
178. The European Central Bank distinguishes three categories: (i) “closed” virtual 
currency schemes, (ii) virtual currencies with “bidirectional flow,” and also (iii) virtual 
currencies with “unidirectional” flow, which combine certain features of the first two categories. 
See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 13-14. For an alternative approach, which 
does not recognize such an “intermediate” category, see FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra 
note 16, at 4; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-
BASED APPROACH 26-27 (2015). 
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currencies used in formal payment systems and vice versa, each 
alternative currency can be allocated to one of three groups: (i) non-
convertible (or closed), (ii) semi-convertible and (iii) fully convertible 
(or open). At first glance, most alternative currencies operating in 
offline – and many online – computer games should belong to the first 
category: these units are generally obtained as a reward for performing 
relevant tasks (e.g., defeating foes, completing quests) and can only be 
spent on virtual items and benefits. The second category is interesting, 
as it encompasses a variety of alternative currencies that can be 
obtained with official currency or SOC but cannot be freely exchanged 
vice versa (at least in accordance with the rules of the alternative 
payment system).179 Bitcoin and other similar currencies (discussed in 
Section V.A.4)180 belong to the third category: they are usually created 
specifically as alternatives to legally recognized forms of money and 
can be converted into official currency or SOC.181 The use of 
convertibility as a classification criterion is nevertheless problematic, 
since there can be different approaches to determining whether an 
alternative currency is truly convertible. 
First, if the actual capacity to be exchanged into official currency 
or SOC is sufficient, then such classification will turn on the factual 
circumstances, namely the existence or absence of a precedent whereby 
a certain alternative currency has ever been converted. But since almost 
anything of value can be exchanged into official currency or SOC, this 
would mean that even computer game currency could be deemed 
convertible. A good example is the existence of so-called “black 
markets” of in-game currencies allowing purchases of virtual currency 
balances for official currency.182 Furthermore, this approach lacks 
certainty, since not all conversions of alternative currency are recorded 
or able to be easily tracked.183 
Second, only convertibility provided directly by the issuer could 
be recognized. This approach makes classification easier but has 
problems of its own. An obvious difficulty is with alternative 
 
179. These include, for example, PlayStation Store credit, Steam Wallet balance, and 
various loyalty programs. 
180.  See discussion infra Section V.A.4. 
181.  For the rationale behind the issuance of Bitcoin, see Nakamoto, supra note 19. 
182. See, e.g., G2G.COM, https://www.g2g.com/ [https://perma.cc/W5VJ-SVYB]. The 
website matches buyers and sellers of various computer game currencies. 
183. This makes the “non-convertible” status rather tricky; it disappears the moment any 
conversion takes place. 
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currencies that have no single issuer,184 which would have to be 
characterized as non-convertible despite the growth of exchanges 
specifically created to allow conversions of such currencies.185 In 
addition, it is unclear how to characterize currencies for which the 
issuer has not established a direct conversion into official currency or 
SOC, but nevertheless permits it indirectly.186 
Third, convertibility could be based on existing legal restrictions 
capable of making exchange of alternative currency not only 
unenforceable, but also unlawful. A recent example can be found in the 
draft Russian Federal Law “On Digital Financial Assets,” which 
permits exchange of “digital financial assets” (a general term that 
includes “cryptocurrencies” and “tokens”) only to the extent that they 
are expressly permitted by the law.187 
Semi-convertible (also known as unidirectional) alternative 
currencies are a good illustration of the diversity of the broad category 
of alternative currencies. For the former, limited convertibility is not 
always a flaw, but can be an important advantage.188 This is true of 
alternative currencies intended to lock in the issuer’s clients (e.g., as 
 
184.  See infra Section V.A.3. 
185. See, e.g., BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019); 
BITFINEX, https://www.bitfinex.com/ [https://perma.cc/7MD9-5AMA]; COINBASE 
https://www.coinbase.com/charts (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
186. Over time, many computer games with online functionality (e.g., massively 
multiplayer online games) and mobile platforms (iOS, Android, and Windows Mobile) have 
developed dedicated conversion mechanisms, allowing players to purchase in-game money with 
official currency or SOC. A recent example is the introduction of the World of Warcraft Token—
an alternative in-game currency which can be purchased by players using the main in-game 
currency (World of Warcraft gold, silver, or copper). The token is convertible into yet another 
alternative currency (Blizzard Balance), which can be used outside the game to purchase various 
digital goods and services provided by the developer. Blizzard Balance uses official currency as 
the unit of account and can be obtained via official currency but is not itself convertible into any 
official currency and is not accepted by third parties. This makes it a semi-convertible alternative 
currency. See WoW Token, BLIZZARD SHOP, https://us.shop.battle.net/en-us/product/world-of-
warcraft-token [https://perma.cc/LAY7-5TST]. For information on restrictions imposed on the 
use of WoW tokens, see Using a WoW Token, BLIZZARD, 
https://us.battle.net/support/en/article/31218 [https://perma.cc/GT95-37QE]. 
187. See Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Digital Financial Assets,” § 4 
(May 22, 2018), http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/419059-7 [https://perma.cc/RQ58-L4R6]. 
Conversion of “tokens” into Rubles and foreign official currency is allowed only via special 
domestic exchanges, whereas conversion of other kinds of “digital financial assets” is subject to 
bespoke rules to be prepared by the Bank of Russia following a consultation with the 
Government. 
188. This is in contrast to SOC, for which close association with official currency is 
paramount. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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part of loyalty programs) or to prevent official currency from escaping 
a certain area or region (e.g., community currencies). 
In some cases, different forms of the same alternative currency 
may enjoy different levels of convertibility. A good example would be 
an existing community currency—the paper version of the Bristol 
Pound—that was mentioned in the previous section. According to the 
relevant terms and conditions, convertibility of the Bristol Pound 
physical notes depends on the status of the client. Non-business clients 
are unable to lawfully exchange Bristol Pound notes into pound sterling 
(“GBP”) (or any other currency) and remain effectively locked in after 
purchasing the physical units (at one to one ratio against the GBP).189 
Businesses, on the other hand, can do a two-step conversion.190 First, 
the paper notes are exchanged for an electronic balance with the Bristol 
Credit Union.191 Second, this electronic balance is converted into 
GBP.192 
Limited convertibility of paper Bristol Pounds aims to ensure that 
currency obtained in the region stays in the region (as it is only accepted 
by participants of the scheme). The restriction is artificially created and 
could hinder market efficiency, but economic aspects of community 
currencies are outside the scope of this Article.193 What matters is that 
this limitation is part of the design and is seen as its strength, rather 
than a weakness. 
 
189. See Bristol Pound, Terms and Conditions for your Bristol Pound Account, 5.9, 
https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/Bristol_Pound_Individual_Terms__
Conditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH3B-PYFN] [hereinafter Bristol Pound, Terms and 
Conditions]; Bristol Pound, Terms and Conditions for Paper Bristol Pounds, second edition 
2015, 5, https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/PaperBristolPoundsTerms_
Conditions2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3LS-YN46] [hereinafter Bristol Pound, Second 
Edition]. 
190. The need to allow businesses to convert Bristol Pound balances is understandable – 
after all, taxes still need to be paid in official currency. The only exception is the Bristol council 
tax, which is payable in Bristol Pounds as well. See Bristol Pound, Did you know you can pay 
your council tax and business rates in Bristol Pounds (Mar. 16 2016), https://bristolpound.org/
pay-council-tax-business-rates-bristol-pounds/ [https://perma.cc/YJ7V-8LYR]. 
191.  See Bristol Pound, Scheme Rules for Individual Members and Trader Members, 11-
12, https://bristolpound.org/wp-content/uploads/Bristol-Pound-Scheme-Rules-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VNQ-TH5V]. 
192. Id. 
193. Community currencies frequently implement other artificial restrictions, such as 
expiry date on physical notes, to encourage spending. For example, the second edition of paper 
Bristol Pounds is valid until 30 September 2018. See Bristol Pound, Second Edition, supra note 
189, at 8.  
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Interestingly, unlike physical Bristol Pounds, electronic accounts 
denominated in Bristol Pounds are freely exchangeable into GBP. This 
raises an important question of separating alternative currencies from 
SOC. Indeed, if each facility allows conversion into official currency, 
then where is the fine line between them? This matter is discussed in 
some detail in Section V.B.2 below.194 
3. Centralized or Decentralized? 
In terms of issuance and administration method, alternative 
currencies can be centralized (i.e., have a single center of issuance and 
administration) or be decentralized (i.e., not have a central authority 
and control mechanism).195 Many digital alternative currencies 
followed the example of Bitcoin (which was the first truly 
decentralized alternative currency) and do not exist as records kept with 
a single trusted party (such as the issuer). They use other methods to 
offer greater transparency and resilience, such as a publicly accessible 
register of transactions shared among users, and blockchain and 
cryptographic hashing to prevent manipulation of transaction 
records.196 
At the same time, transparency and resilience alone are not 
enough. In a truly decentralized system, end-users who adopt the 
relevant currency may wish to have the collective ability to tweak its 
parameters to improve certain features, correct mistakes or modernize 
the currency to adjust to the changing technological, legal or economic 
realities. Elimination of a trusted intermediary creates the need for a 
decision-making layer and end-user democracy. In the history of 
Bitcoin (discussed in the upcoming section),197 the corresponding 
changes are represented by a “proof-of-work”198 consensus algorithm 
 
194.  See infra Section V.B.2. 
195. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 9; FINANCIAL ACTION TASK 
FORCE, supra note 16, at 5. 
196.  How do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/
P9MP-977G]. 
197 See infra Section V.A.4. 
198. In a proof-of-work algorithm, different user-operated nodes try to solve a resource-
intensive mathematical problem. “The first node to solve the problem is compensated, while all 
others use the solution provided by the first node to verify that the problem has been correctly 
solved.” Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, The Distributed Liability of 
Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1372 n.44 (2018). 
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and so-called “forks” in the development of the currency protocol, in 
particular “hard forks” that essentially split the user base.199 
4. The Bitcoin Legacy 
The launch of Bitcoin200 in 2009 gave rise to the subsequent 
development of a whole range of new digital alternative currencies 
(now commonly referred to as “cryptocurrencies”), the number of 
which has skyrocketed. According to some calculations, in 2015 their 
overall number reached 500,201 and at the time of writing, in mid-2018, 
it has more than tripled, to over 1,700. These figures have been 
increasing steadily and have become significantly outdated by the time 
this Article is published, exceeding 2,100.202  
The word used to collectively describe Bitcoin and its spin-offs—
“cryptocurrency”—is extremely confusing. After all, cryptography is 
an implicit feature not only of most digital alternative currencies, but 
also bank accounts and SOC. This makes the term “cryptocurrency” 
essentially meaningless in the context of this Article. Unfortunately, 
alternative names (like “algorithmic digital currencies”) are not that 
much better.203 The reason is the same: the terms do not capture the 
entire specter of digital alternative currencies that were brought into 
existence following Bitcoin’s lead. 
Let us consider Bitcoin alone for now. From a technical 
perspective, this digital currency is a combination of various 
technologies, including: (i) blockchain204 (based on hashing transaction 
data)205 (ii) use of distributed ledger technology, whereby the 
transaction database is shared among all users, (iii) a special consensus 
algorithm called “proof of work,”206 and (iv) very high but flexible 
 
199. Walch, supra note 11, at 738-39. 
200. Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency and the first decentralized convertible virtual 
currency. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 5-6. For additional detail, see 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 22; Nakamoto, supra note 19. 
201. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 4. 
202. See All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 1. 
203. See Raskin & Yermack, supra note 166, at 1. It is unclear which algorithms are 
covered. If these are cryptographic algorithms, then the problem is the same as with 
“cryptocurrencies.” If these are algorithms designed to generate new currencies, these exist even 
in the simplest of digital alternative currencies, making it hard to identify algorithmic currencies 
as a separate group. 
204. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
205. Bitcoin uses a hashing algorithm called SHA-256. Even a slight variation of the input 
data results in an entirely different hash. 
206. See ZETZSCHE, BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
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requirements for confirming new transactions.207 Although many 
digital alternative currencies have attempted to copy the Bitcoin 
structure, others have chosen to alter certain features, to create a unique 
currency, with a different set of resulting characteristics.208 There is 
simply no common denominator, and this variety makes it impractical 
to develop a single term for all the Bitcoin spin-offs. 
B. Alternative Currencies: Legal Status and Regulatory Implications 
1. Uncertain Legal Status of Alternative Currencies 
Only certain types of alternative currencies have triggered a 
regulatory response. Unlike their freely convertible counterparts, 
alternative currencies operating (at least nominally) within closed 
virtual systems remain unregulated. Semi-convertible alternative 
currencies are becoming increasingly popular209 in mobile and 
computer games and also do not seem to attract regulatory attention 
insofar as their use is limited to virtual communities. This is not to say 
virtual economies cannot have a connection to the real one, as the 
European Central Bank (“ECB”) helpfully reminds us in its paper: 
Therefore, an illustration of a flower sent to someone else in a 
social network or better equipment for a character which is needed 
to reach higher levels in an online game are two examples of 
virtual goods that are sold in virtual communities. However, in our 
view, there should be a clear differentiation between goods that are 
used only in the virtual environment and those which are used in 
the real world (e.g. music files or electronic books).210 
The situation with regulatory treatment of freely convertible 
alternative currencies is more complicated. Clear links to the real 
economy and entry points to the formal payment system are a cause for 
concern, which is reflected in various regulatory measures adopted 
throughout the globe. These currencies are predominantly211 not 
 
207. The algorithm is adjusted to ensure that the mathematical problem that needs to be 
solved as part of proof of work does not become trivial as the overall computational power of 
the DLT network increases. 
208. For example, Ripple is essentially centralized. See Bitmex Research, The Ripple 
story, BITMEX, (Feb. 6 2018) https://blog.bitmex.com/the-ripple-story/ [https://perma.cc/S3J9-
QW7U]. 
209. See supra note 186. 
210. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, n 6. 
211. A notable exception is a sub-class of digital alternative currencies called 
“stablecoins”: their value is linked to fiat money (e.g., Tether, Dai, Utility Settlement Coin) or 
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backed by any real assets and total supply of them is typically limited, 
which makes them inherently volatile, as has been demonstrated by the 
very significant fluctuations in Bitcoin prices.212 High risks and low 
numbers of accepting merchants make their use as a store of value and 
unit of account problematic. By warning end-users about underlying 
risks213 and restricting commercial banks from engaging in operations 
with digital alternative currencies, regulators safeguard the formal 
payment system against exogenous money supply and the resulting 
implications for system stability.214 
The most popular regulatory reaction to digital alternative 
currencies so far has been warnings and prohibitions on their use as 
part of the formal payment system, as well as clarifications on their 
legal status.215 In contrast, some states have gone further, attempting to 
subject digital alternative currencies to comprehensive domestic 
regulation.216 
2. Digital Alternative Currencies and SOC 
Although currencies used in computer games and Bitcoin are 
unlikely to be confused with SOC due to insufficient links to official 
currency,217 the same is not always true for all digital alternative 
currencies. Classification difficulties are possible when a digital 
alternative currency is (i) issued and administered by a single entity 
(i.e., not via a distributed ledger using consensus algorithms to verify 
transactions, as is the case with Bitcoin) and (ii) convertible by the 
issuer into official currency. In this scenario, similarities with SOC 
would be striking. Neither enjoys the status of legal tender, and thus 
 
other assets (such as bullion in the case of Digix). Despite apparent advantages, convertibility 
of stablecoins is not guaranteed as a matter of law and is based entirely on the infrastructure 
created by their developers. Insufficient (or non-existent) disclosure, oversight, and enforcement 
mechanisms add to the underlying risks. 
212. Although the price of a single Bitcoin did not exceed US$1 initially, December 2017 
recorded an all-time high of nearly US$20,000. By the end of January 2018, Bitcoin fell sharply 
to almost US$11,000. See Bitcoin Price, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/. 
213. These include limited transparency, lack of continuity, high IT and network 
dependency, as well as anonymity/pseudonymity. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra 
note 12, at 20-23. 
214. For examples of integration of digital alternative currencies in real life economy, see 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 16. 
215. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2015, supra note 12, at 30-32. 
216. See, e.g., Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Digital Financial Assets,” 
§ 4 (May 22, 2018), http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/419059-7 [https://perma.cc/RQ58-L4R6]. 
217. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
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their usability depends on available infrastructure and arrangements 
with the other members participating in the scheme (e.g., merchants). 
Consequently, the underlying systemic risks are limited to the users of 
the relevant scheme, meaning that the impact on the real economy is 
directly proportional to the popularity of the relevant network among 
end-users.218 In the light of these similarities, both can be seen as 
knock-offs of official currency. But if this is the case, why are only 
SOC considered part of the formal payment system? 
It appears that the key distinction should lie in how the currency 
is sourced and supplied. Circulation of a digital currency that is issued 
only in exchange for official currency of similar value has a neutral 
effect on official currency and ensures seamless integration into the 
formal payment system. This is a feature of SOC. In contrast, digital 
alternative currencies that are convertible into official currency, but 
have no similar checks on their supply, increase the number of currency 
units in circulation thereby creating exogenous supply of official 
currency. In other words, the supply of alternative currencies is 
ultimately determined by developers of the corresponding technology, 
rather than by the amount of official currency in circulation (with which 
alternative currencies have no, or very limited, correlation). 
Unfortunately, the nature of this distinction between SOC and 
digital alternative currencies has not been given sufficient weight: early 
attempts to differentiate between the two were based on regulatory 
implications instead. For example, in 2012 the ECB adopted a 
simplistic view that the key difference is that electronic money (a type 
of SOC) is regulated and is expressed in the same units of account as 
official currency.219 This analysis could have remained purely 
theoretical if it were not for a recent revision of the EU law. 
Accidentally, however, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) 
Directive, that came into force on July 9, 2018,220 has provided an 
excellent opportunity to examine and compare actual rules of law 
governing electronic money and virtual currencies (a type of official 
currency) within a single legal system. Let us now compare the relevant 
 
218. As a result of these similarities, the two categories are sometimes used 
interchangeably. See, e.g., BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 18, at 4. 
219. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 16-17; EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK 2012, supra note 8, at 11 & Table “A money matrix.” 
220.  Directive 2018/843, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, 
2018 O.J. (L 156). 
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definitions in the E-Money Directive and the Fifth AML Directive. The 
former defines “electronic money” as follows: 
“[E]lectronic money” means electronically, including 
magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on 
the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of 
making payment transactions . . . , and which is accepted by a 
natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer.221 
The key elements of this definition are: (i) a store of value, (ii) 
electronic form, (iii) claim on the issuer, (iv) credit based on receipt of 
funds, and (v) acceptance by third parties. In contrast, the Fifth AML 
Directive clearly states that virtual currencies are a separate legal 
category, which “should not . . . be confused with electronic money”222 
and defines the new term as follows: 
“[V]irtual currencies” means a digital representation of value that 
is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, 
is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and 
does not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is 
accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and 
which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.223 
The new term was designed to be separate, but many of its 
elements are similar to the “electronic money” definition. Just like in 
the definition of “electronic money,” it refers to (i) a store (or 
representation) of value, (ii) electronic form, and (iii) acceptance by 
third parties. Just as easily a virtual currency can meet the two 
remaining features of “electronic money,” namely issuance on receipt 
of funds and being a claim on the issuer (this would be the case for 
certain centralized digital alternative currencies). Additional elements 
that are unique for the definition of “virtual currencies” not add much 
to separate the two terms. First, electronic money does not have to be 
(and is almost never) issued by a central bank or a public authority. 
Second, it follows from the second definition that a virtual currency 
attached to a “legally established currency” remains a possibility. 
This leaves us with only one meaningful criterion to separate the 
two concepts—“a legal status of currency or money”—being a test that 
virtual currencies are not expected to meet. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
what exactly gives a “legal” status to a currency. Presumably, the text 
 
221. Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267), art. 2(2). 
222. Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156), Preamble ¶ 10.  
223. Directive No. 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156), art. 1(2)(d). 
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implies a status of official currency (which is usually the currency 
issued by the state), as well as SOC (in EU terminology – electronic 
money). If this assumption is correct, the test works by making it 
impossible to meet the criteria of a “virtual currency” as long as all 
criteria of “electronic money” are met (the latter precludes 
characterization as virtual currency). 
This highlights the residual nature of the category of “alternative 
currencies.” In the example above, all other things being equal, 
classification of a currency as “electronic money” and not “virtual 
currency” can only result from the primacy of one category (“electronic 
money”) over the other (“virtual currency”). This primacy is based on 
the idea that the former has a certain “legal” status that the latter lacks 
(even though the nature of this legal status is not adequately established 
by the law). 
VI. NEXT STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL CURRENCY 
A. Implications of the Formal Payment System 
As recently as fifteen years ago, the fundamentals of a two-tier 
payment system based on official currency issued by central banks and 
commercial banks appeared axiomatic. A 2003 report by the Bank for 
International Settlements summarized the joint position of the central 
banks on its Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (“CPSS”) 
as follows: 
The CPSS central banks share the conviction that the composite of 
central and commercial bank money, convertible at par, is 
essential to the safety and efficiency of the financial system and 
should remain the basis of the singleness of the currency. In other 
words, central banks would accept neither an outcome in which 
central bank money crowds out private initiative, nor an outcome 
in which central bank money is phased out by a market 
mechanism. Neither of these two outcomes is regarded as plausible 
in the near future.224 
 
224. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 71, at 6-7. 
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The future has now arrived, with the lessons (hopefully) learned 
from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and renewed warnings 
about the shaky foundations of the current banking system.225 
Despite all its benefits,226 the ultimate form of settlement—central 
bank accounts—enjoys only limited use among non-banks, smaller 
financial institutions and the public: cash is reserved for minor 
transactions, while settlements via central bank accounts are usually 
performed only by the largest banks. Everywhere else, commercial 
banks provide the dominant form of digital official currency, which, in 
legal terms, remains no more than a claim against the relevant financial 
institution. Since a claim is only as good as the reputation and financial 
standing of the party promising to honor it, this monopoly is built on 
public trust regulators aim to reinforce (e.g., by way of deposit 
insurance schemes), and if for whatever reason that trust is misplaced, 
end-users of official currency have little choice (except hoarding cash 
or investing in other assets). 
The unavoidable result is that end-users essentially take on credit 
risks vis-à-vis their banks every time, even when they do not intend to 
extend credit (e.g., when earning a salary).227 For the great majority of 
end-users there is simply no way at present to use official currency 
without such credit risk. Interestingly, while there are instruments 
protecting banks against additional credit exposure, such as 
subordinated loans eligible for capital inclusion,228 there is no extra 
protection for individual account holders (except deposit 
insurance229—which is inconvenient because of upper coverage limits 
and the resulting need to spread one’s accounts across various financial 
institutions to circumvent this restriction). For businesses, deposit 
insurance is of even lesser use (or may not exist in the first place). 
Finally, in the case of negative interest rates, this status quo seems 
 
225. See Martin Wolf, Banking Remains Far Too Undercapitalised for Comfort, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 21 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9dd43a1a-9d49-11e7-8cd4-
932067fbf946 (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
226. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
227. Even where deposit insurance exists, the credit risks persist above statutory limits. In 
addition, recovery of funds following a bank collapse may take time and effort. 
228. The criteria such loans must meet to qualify as capital often include restrictions on 
early repayment, such as the need to obtain regulator’s approval. See, e.g., Bank of Russia, 
Regulation No. 395-P of Dec. 28, 2012, on the methodology for Determining the Amount of 
Own Funds (Capital) of Credit Institutions (Basel III), § 3.1.8.  
229.  See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §1821 (1989); see also in Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 331-336, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1540 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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totally absurd: depositors are charged for taking on credit risk vis-à-vis 
their bank. 
B. Three Ways Forward for Official Currency 
In her recent speech at the Bank of England, Christine Lagarde 
cautiously pictured a future that may not be too distant: “If privately 
issued virtual currencies remain risky and unstable, citizens may even 
call on central banks to provide digital forms of legal tender.”230 
In this section we outline three possible approaches: (i) central 
bank accounts with general access, (ii) central bank accounts with 
intermediated access, and (iii) new digital forms of official currency. 
1. Central Bank Accounts with Intermediated Access 
The idea to provide safer options for storing value in the form of 
official currency is not new. Back in 1987, Nobel Laureate James Tobin 
suggested making available to the general public so-called “deposited 
currency” to minimize reliance on deposit insurance schemes: “I think 
the government should make available to the public a medium with the 
convenience of deposits and the safety of currency, essentially currency 
on deposit, transferable in any amount by check or other order.”231 The 
new type of currency, according to Tobin, could be provided by Federal 
Reserve Banks themselves or by commercial banks, provided that the 
funds so deposited are isolated from the rest of their own liabilities.232 
At the time, direct central bank accounts appeared a somewhat distant 
opportunity: even in the first scenario Tobin expected Federal Reserve 
Banks to act via “conveniently located agencies in private banks or post 
offices.”233 
Many of the more recent proposals similarly suggest an 
intermediated approach, whereby central banks act through specially 
authorized counterparties providing access to central bank accounts. In 
a 2016 research paper, Dyson and Hodgson argue in favor of “Digital 
Cash Accounts” held by private operators guaranteed by central 
 
230. Christine Lagarde, Central Banking and Fintech – A Brave New World?, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/
2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-a-brave-new-world [https://perma.cc/
EF3Y-BSR3] (emphasis added). 
231. James Tobin, A Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, 30 CHALLENGE 10, 13 
(1987). 
232.  Id. 
233. Id. 
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banks.234 These operators (labelled “DCA Providers”) would be 
prohibited from lending or taking on any new risks on client funds.235 
In addition, it is expected that a multiplicity of operators would create 
competition and reduce the administrative burden on central banks.236 
In a similar fashion, Ketterer and Andrade envisage (as one of the 
possible alternatives) a model whereby private firms “would provide 
all the transactional and costumer [sic] services related to CBM [central 
bank money] accounts,” while maintaining a 100% reserve for each 
deposit at all times.237 
Intermediation of central bank accounts can take various forms, 
from new types of commercial bank accounts, to accounts with trusted 
intermediaries fully guaranteed by the central bank. In each case, 
however, users of the new currency should have direct recourse to 
central bank accounts. 
2. Central Bank Accounts with Direct Access 
Needless to say, over the past thirty years, technology has 
advanced way beyond Tobin’s cautious expectations: “Computer 
capabilities should soon make it possible to withdraw conventional 
currency at any office or agency, and even to order payments to third 
parties by card or telephone.”238 With this in mind, modern 
commentators call for broader direct access to central bank accounts 
for the general public and non-financial institutions.239 
 
234. Ben Dyson & Graham Hodgson, Digital Cash: Why Central Banks Should Start 
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[https://perma.cc/BJ7S-Y8C4]. 
238. Tobin, supra note 231, at 13.  
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932067fbf946]; JP Koning, Central Banks Deposits for You and Me, MONEYNESS (Aug. 10 
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[https://perma.cc/Y3AD-M95V]; Dyson & Hodgson, supra note 234. 
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As discussed previously in Section IV.A,240 the list of persons or 
entities with direct access to central bank accounts is rather limited. 
Expansion of this list to cover a wider user base is fraught with three 
major difficulties: (i) it requires a greatly increased amount of 
computing power and cybersecurity; (ii) more significantly, it requires 
a massive amount of customer-facing infrastructure that central banks 
today lack and are not configured to ever provide; and (iii) more 
systemically, central bank accounts with direct access would compete 
with other formal currency types and would likely undermine the 
position of other currency operators (such as commercial banks) with 
massively destabilizing consequences for the broader economy. 
3. New Forms of Official Currency 
Whereas the first two options are based on central bank accounts 
and, consequently, can be seen as steps in the evolution of existing 
currency types, the third option represents a major change – the 
creation of a new type of official currency. This new currency is issued 
by the state, but is not tied to central bank accounts and does not rely 
on intermediaries. The first example of such official currency is the 
Petro launched in Venezuela in February 2018.241 
At first glance, the Petro can be easily confused with alternative 
currencies. First, it is issued in the form of a public offering (commonly 
known as an “ICO”).242 Second, its terms and technical characteristics 
are listed in a “white paper”—the standard practice for issuing new 
digital alternative currencies.243 Third, it utilizes blockchain244 for 
secure recordkeeping and disintermediation. Despite these similarities, 
the new currency cannot be characterized as an alternative currency due 
to its distinct legal status.245 The official white paper declares: 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela guarantees that it will 
accept Petro’s as a form of payment of national taxes, fees, 
 
240.  See supra Section IV.A. 
241.  Kevin Helms, Venezuela Makes Petro Crypto a National Currency, Publishes New 
Whitepaper, BITCOIN (Oct. 4, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/venezuela-petro-new-
whitepaper/ [https://perma.cc/6R3M-V9H9]. 
242. For more detail on the operation of ICOs, see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, 
Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super 
Challenge for Regulators, 63 HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2019), available at 
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contributions and public services, taking as a reference the price 
of the barrel of the Venezuelan basket of the previous day with a 
percentage discount.246 
The emphasis here is not on the connection with oil prices – after 
all, there are a number of alternative currencies pegged to various 
assets, and this is simply a price-setting mechanism.247 Instead, the 
focus should be on the mechanisms used by the state to promote 
circulation of the new currency as a medium of exchange. A state’s 
acceptance of a currency in payments to itself is a defining feature of 
official currencies.248 So upon the taxonomy proposed in this Article, 
the Petro is a strange creature, it is an official currency offered not by 
issuance by a national central bank in the usual way, but in an ICO, so 
that presumably the supply of Petros is limited until another ICO issues 
more into the market. 
The Petro is likely to pave the way to new state-backed digital 
official currencies, and one can already see the first signs of regulatory 
changes reflecting the emergence of such new currencies. For example, 
the new definitions introduced in the Fifth AML Directive discussed in 
Section V.B.2 above249 make it clear that an alternative digital currency 
“issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority”250 is not 
considered a virtual currency. What is it then if not a new sovereign 
digital official currency? 
C. New Opportunities and New Challenges 
Evolutionary features of the new approaches to official currencies 
stem from their prospective benefits. First, all three approaches listed 
in Sections VI.B.1-VI.B.3251 offer an opportunity to reduce the risks of 
using official currency, either by completely eliminating any 
intermediaries, or by making intermediation riskless (in the case of 
intermediated central bank accounts discussed in Section VI.B.1 
above).252 Second, in either case the resulting medium of exchange 
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enjoys the status of official currency – and consequently increases the 
variety of payment instruments available to end-users. Third, the new 
instruments are likely to implement some of the useful features of 
alternative currencies. For example, the Petro uses blockchain 
technology as an instrument for arranging transaction data into tamper-
proof chronologically-arranged data units – in hopes that algorithm-
based transaction recording will promote end-user trust in the new 
currency.253 Blockchain’s enhanced record-keeping functionality can 
be used to greatly enhance states’ capability to monitor the flow of 
funds in the economy and resolve other technical problems.254 It should 
be noted, however, that these new technologies are likely to undergo a 
number of transformations in the hands of the state before 
implementation. Thus, in contrast to Bitcoin, which first implemented 
blockchain as part of a public currency with a decentralized governance 
system accessible by anyone with a computer, the “sovereign 
blockchain” is likely to be built in a closed, private system controlled 
by the state and with a strong governance layer provided by the state 
that sits atop the blockchain and with power to amend it.255 Fourth, 
increased circulation of new state-backed digital official currencies 
would reduce circulation of cash and reduce the costs of replacing 
deteriorating banknotes. 
Despite the above opportunities, challenges will be many. First, 
integration of a new currency having the benefit of state backing may 
jeopardize the utility of bank accounts and SOC. States will have to 
make important policy decisions to maintain a healthy balance within 
the payment system: uncontrolled expansion of new state-backed 
official currencies may lead to instant bank runs. One should note, 
however, that regulators and legislators have a wide range of 
instruments to address this potential problem: from purely economic 
(such as negative interest rates for central bank accounts to discourage 
mass withdrawals from commercial bank deposits) to administrative 
(such as limitations on the amount of new currency owned by each 
person or increasing the coverage limits of deposit insurance). Second, 
the recent revisions to the Fifth AML Directive, which provides for 
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additional AML checks for virtual currencies,256 indicate that states are 
unlikely to permit anonymous circulation of new units of digital 
currency. As a result, additional identification and know-your-
customer mechanisms will have to be implemented, at additional costs. 
Third, benefits of the new official currencies for end-users, particularly 
individuals, may be questionable. On the one hand, those who prefer 
anonymized transactions are unlikely to appreciate the complete 
visibility of payment transactions monitored by the state. On the other 
hand, governments may offer tangible benefits to support the new 
projects, such as simplified conversion of new digital official 
currencies into official currency of other states based on arrangements 
with other states implementing similar initiatives.257 Fourth, legal 
systems will need to be adjusted to formalize the legal status of the 
relevant currencies as a medium of exchange accepted as official 
currency.258 
However, one of the biggest possible challenges stems from the 
herding effect that may result from the adoption of a disintermediated 
state-backed official currency by a major economy, like the United 
States. The utility of an official medium of exchange digitally available 
to end-users without any intermediaries is hard to overestimate – such 
a currency could quickly become a dominant medium of exchange in 
international transactions, without meaningful ways for other states to 
regulate it, since the underlying technology easily penetrates national 
boundaries. One possible response for other states in this scenario could 
be the development of their own competing sovereign digital 
currencies and their promotion for internal use. This could explain, at 
least in part, why so many national regulators have expressed interest 
in devising a new sovereign currency.259 Few nations appear keen to 
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take the leap into the unknown involved in issuing a sovereign digital 
currency. However, many nations recognize that should a credible 
major country issue a sovereign digital currency, it may offer 
considerable advantages over regular currency in the first-mentioned 
nation’s jurisdiction, and so the nation could rapidly face the loss of 
both monetary sovereignty and of the data associated with the use of 
the sovereign digital currency which will be collected by the issuing 
sovereign abroad, not the nation within which it is being used. Only 
time will tell the answer, but for now one question remains: which 
country will be the first to throw down the gauntlet in the sovereign 
digital currency battle?260 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The currency taxonomy proposed in this Article, which is based 
on separating formal and alternative payment systems, offers two main 
advantages: consistency and flexibility. The focus on just one function 
of money (medium of exchange) ensures that elements of taxonomy 
are comparable and eliminates characterization issues (such as whether 
a state’s national currency is not stable enough to perform the store of 
value function necessary for classification as “money”). Flexibility 
stems from the functional approach, which makes it possible to 
flawlessly integrate new state-backed digital currencies, which are 
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likely to have a major impact on how payment systems operate – either 
by allowing broader access to central bank accounts (whether directly 
or indirectly), or by implementing entirely new, bespoke media of 
exchange. 
Our analysis of the formal payment system shows that payment 
instruments that were designed to be tightly connected to official 
currency should be classified as part of the formal payment system. 
Although they possess sufficient distinguishing features not to be 
assimilated with official currencies, their association with the latter 
(including the neutral effect on the supply of official currency) justify 
their classification as surrogates. 
The taxonomy in this Article highlights important classification 
problems. First, in some situations (e.g., when an alternative currency 
has a single issuer and is pegged to official currency), SOCs and 
alternative currencies may be so similar functionally, that any 
difference in classification has to be based on regulatory treatment 
alone. Second, the use of convertibility as a classification criterion for 
alternative currencies is fraught with practical difficulties, since, even 
where conversion may be officially prohibited, it is frequently arranged 
by other, indirect, means – provided there is sufficient demand. 
This Article suggests three different ways forward for the 
evolution of official currencies. Major economies are very highly 
unlikely to structure their own state-backed digital currencies along the 
lines of Venezuela’s newly issued sovereign digital currency (the 
Petro). However, the launch of the Petro has heralded the entry of 
governments onto the digital currency stage in a process that will most 
likely continue so that digital alternative currencies like Bitcoin are 
going to face increased competition. Furthermore, we explain that the 
launch of additional state-backed digital currencies – particularly by 
major economies – is likely to have a strong flow-on effect, resulting 
in the proliferation of similar currencies across the globe. This future is 
very real and may be very near. 
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